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ABSTRACT

This study is an analysis of Indo-American relations
between 1947 and 1972. What this thesis seeks to achieve
is an understanding of the principal factors that
determined Indo-American bilateral relations.
In this thesis, it will be argued that the absence of
common Indian and American strategic interests and global
perceptions were a manifestation of their different
historical experiences and geographic locations.
Further,
since the limited contact, prior to 1947, provided little
foundation upon which to build bilateral ties, Indo-US
relations were moulded by the international strategic
environment, which is to say, bilateral relations depended
upon whether any compatibility of interests and policies
could be formally recognised.
This analysis of Indo-US relations suggests that, when
nations have different objectives and interests, the
intensity of bilateral relations is dependent upon
strategic perceptions. Only when the strategic perceptions
and immediate interests of India and the United States
converged did Indo-American bilateral relations perceptibly
improve.

v

AN ANALYSIS OF
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS
INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES
1947 - 1972

INTRODUCTION

Analysing Indo-American relations as they evolved after
India's independence from the British in 1947 is, indeed, a
daunting task. Separated by more than merely geography, the
two countries stumbled into each other's presence in the
1940s, spent almost a decade attempting to understand the
logic that propelled each other's ideas and perceptions of
the world, settled down in the 1960s to build bridges and
link their destinies, only to find that they were unable, in
reality, to transform hopes and aspirations into concrete
policies that could be characterized as a mutual identity of
purpose.

While nation states in the latter half of the

twentieth century rarely admit that they are at "logger
heads" with each other, I do not think it is presumptuous of
me to characterize Indo-US relations in the period between
1947 and 1972 as a series of alternating currents; flowing
at times harmoniously together and, at other times, at cross
purposes.
That relations between the two largest and most
dissimilar democratic republics did not mature into settled
patterns earlier, despite some eagerness on both sides, can
be attributed, in part, to the numerous factors and
considerations that separate the two countries.
2

Even a
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casual glance at a map of the world reveals the distance
that separates India from the United States.

Geography,

moreover, contributed to the divergent historical traditions
experienced by the two countries.

Although both countries

had, at one time or another, been colonies of the British
Empire, the similarity in their respective historical
traditions ends there.

America won her independence from

the British in the eighteenth century, over eighty years
before the first major revolt against the British by Indians
in 1857, and over a century before the founding of the
Indian National Congress, India's first nationalist
political party, in 1885.

Further, it was not until the

United States entered the Second World War in 1941 that
India and the United States came into official contact with
each other.
Although Indian history, like its American counterpart,
demonstrates the assimilation of varied cultures to form a
heterogenous Indian character, the vast majority of foreign
invaders that eventually represented an ethnic stream of
Indian culture were primarily Asian in origin.

The fact

that the British were always regarded as foreigners and that
political developments in Europe and the Western world never
had a profound impact on events in India, even whilst a
colony, says something about the divergence in historical
experiences between India and the Western world.
Another factor that played a considerable role in
accentuating the differences between India and the United
States in the latter half of the twentieth century was the

difference in status beween the two countries.

The United

States emerged from the Second World War as the world's
premier economic, military and diplomatic power.

India, on

the other hand, only won her independence in 1947, was
racked by civil strife, and was an economic basket case,
unable to survive, it appeared, without substantial
assistance from the United States, the only country in 1947
in a position to help alleviate India's economic plight.
Despite the tremendous dissimilarities between the
United States and India, both countries initiated official
relations with the other with considerable optimism for
close bilateral relations.

The United States initially

looked upon India as a prospective ally, based primarily
upon the fact that both countries were democracies and upon
India's ties with Britain and the Commonwealth.

India,

concurrently, looked towards the United States as a
potential ally in her crusade against colonialism, and as a
government from whom India could expect economic assistance.
However, this mutual optimism, as subsequent developments
proved, was ill-founded and misdirected.
The different historical experiences and geographic
locations of India and the United States manifested
themselves in the garb of divergent strategic interests and
global perceptions.

Containing the twin threats of the

Soviet Union and international communism had, by 1947,
become the corner-stone of American foreign policy.

India,

on the other hand, regarded the Cold War as a derivative of
Western historical experience, which it did not share.

As
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the first Asian nation to win its independence, India
focussed upon anti-colonialism and the representation of
Asian interests in a world still largely defined from a
Western persective.
In this thesis, it will be argued that the absence of
common Indian and American strategic perceptions was a
manifestation of their different historical experiences and
geographical locations.

Further, since the limited contact

between the two countries, prior to 1947, provided little
foundation upon which to build bilateral ties, Indo-American
relations were moulded by the international security
environment, which is to say, bilateral relations depended
upon whether any compatibility of interests and policies
could be formally recognised.

However, each government

defined its political and military objectives in a manner
that encroached upon the other’s interests, thus making x
collaboration extremely difficult.

Even though both India

and the United States shared common interests in their
antipathy to colonialism and communism, for example, they
differed in their methods of opposing these forces, and they
perceived threats to peace differently.
Having determined that it was the international
security environment that moulded Indo-US relations, rather
than a common strategic perspective, it is important to
describe the weave that patterned these relations.
India, in 1947, had little diplomatic power, negligible
military strength, and no economic infrastructure that could
be of any fundamental benefit to the United States.
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Moreover, since divergent historical experiences and
geographical locations precluded the possibility of India
sharing the United States1 strategic interests and global
perceptions, there was little that India had to offer the
United States in order for the latter to focus its attention
on India.

Although the United States did have a global

vision of which the Indian sub-continent was a part, it
would be unrealistic to expect the United States, a country
which emerged from the Second World War as the most powerful
global power, to develop a specific policy for India, an
infant states sans military muscle or economic power and
struggling for its existence.

In other words, India could

be of significance to the United States only if it
identified with US interests and objectives.

India, on the

other hand, because of the divergence in status between the
two countries, had continually to recognise the importance
of the United States as a central figure in its foreign
policy planning.

Because the United States was the world's

leading global power, almost all its actions— diplomatic,
military or economic— had a repercussion in India, whether
India was the intended beneficiary or not.

India, in

contrast, was of value to the United States only if it
adjusted its global perceptions to identify with those held
by the United States, the dominant partner in the
relationship.
That, in essence, is the pattern that describes Indo-US
relations in the period between 1947 and 1972.

Because of

the limited political contacts between the two countries
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prior to 1947, and the different historical traditions and
geographical locations of India and the United States, it
was the international strategic environment that moulded
Indo-American relations.

Moreover, and more important, it

was only when India adjusted her strategic perceptions to be
in identity with those of the United States that relations
between the two countries perceptibly improved.
While this thesis, through a narration and analysis of
events, serves as an example to show how relations between a
global power and Third World nation evolves, what it
demonstrates quite conclusively is that bilateral relations
between countries of divergent sizes and power do not hinge
upon stated long term objectives, however much these
objectives may be in congruence.

Instead, this analysis of

Indo-US relations suggests that, when nations have different
objectives and interests, the intensity of bilateral
relations is dependent upon

strategic perceptions.

Only

when the strategic perceptions and immediate interests of
India and the United States converged did Indo-US bilateral
relations perceptibly improve.
I am not suggesting that the convergence and divergence
of strategic interests and perceptions is the only factor
that determined the nature of Indo-American relations.
Individuals played a significant role in the maturing of
these relations, as evidenced by the difference Ambassadors
Chester Bowles and John Kenneth Galbraith made to Indian
attitudes towards America, as determined by the importance
President Kennedy placed upon India's economic success, and

as demonstrated by the common personal antipathy which
President Nixon and Prime Minister Gandhi held for each
other.

Similarly, the liberal beliefs of Kennedy's

Administation resulted in a major swing in Indo-US
relations, as did Prime Minister Nehru's personality and
commitment to an independent foreign policy for an
independent India.

While all these factors, among others,

manifested themselves in ways that helped influence Indo-US
relations, it would be inaccurate to suggest that
Indo-American relations hinged primarily on these factors.
Indo-American relations beween 1947 and 1972, as this
thesis demonstrates, were unplanned, therefore
unpredictable.

Although both countries shared common long

term objectives, immediate bilateral relations were shaped
by the international strategic environment.

Since there was

a disparity in the status of the two countries and in terms
of one's importance to the other, it was only when India
adjusted her global perceptions to identify with those of
the United States, or when their interests were in
congruence, that bilateral relations perceptibly improved.
In other words, what this thesis demonstrates is the fact
that the intensity of Indo-US relations between 1947 and
1972 was determined by the convergence and divergence of
strategic perceptions.
It is when their strategic perceptions and interests
have been in tandem that the two countries have shared
warmer bilateral relations.

At other times, when there has

been a divergence in interests and perceptions, the
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relationship can be described as one of exasperatedly
strained cordiality, like a couple that can neither get
along nor separate, given the fact that the two countries
shared declared long term interests and objectives, but
divergent perceptions.
Since the differences and changes in perceptions by the
United States and India, between 1947 and 1972, were most
marked with respect to the Soviet Union, China and Pakistan,
the three countries of greatest common strategic importance
to India and the United States, we find that this study of
Indo-US relations, while highlighting the changing
international strategic environment in general, focusses
most closely on these three countries in particular.

It is

when the views of India and the United States, with
particular respect to China, Pakistan and the Soviet Union,
have converged and been in harmony that Indo-American
bilateral relations adopted a warmer tone.
I have focussed my attention on three periods, or case
studies, really, to facilitate the conduct of my study.
This study of Indo-US relations does not attempt to describe
and analyse the period 1947 to 1972 in its entirety.

The

three periods upon which I have focussed are what I consider
to be the most significant, and represent the clearest
fluctuations in Indo-US relations, namely that of the
periods beween 1947 and 1954, 1961 and 1965, and 1969 and
1972.
The first case study, 1947-54, is important because it
describes the early tentative appraisals undertaken by both
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countries in attempting to understand and evaluate each
other.

This period highlights the differences in

perceptions beween the United States and India through a
variety of interests.

The United States was, in 1947,

primarily interested in containing the expansion of the
Soviet communist threat, a perception India did not share.
Although India was clearly closer to the United States than
the Soviet Union, it did not share the American perspective
or agree with the method chosen by the United States to
contain communist Russia.

When China fell to the communists

in 1949, America viewed this development with alarm while
India welcomed the development and declared its Asian
foreign policy objectives as being in tandem with those of
China.

Further, by chosing non-alignment as the principal

vehicle for its foreign policy, India chose not to ally with
the United States in containing the communist nations to its
immediate north, China and the Soviet Union.

Having

consciously decided against allying with the United States,
India found that America entered a military relationship
with Pakistan, India's antagonistic neighbour, in 1954.
The years between 1947 and 1954 swing from a period
where the two countries are optimistic about the future of
Indo-US relations, to a period when divergent strategic
perceptions with regard to the Soviet Union and China forces
the United States to select Pakistan as its Asian ally,
isolating India in the process.

A detailed study of this

period highlights how different historical experiences and
geographical locations led to divergent strategic
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perspectives, which in turn caused the two countries to view
each other with suspicion and mistrust.
The second case study, 1961-65, is in direct contrast
to the earlier period for a variety of reasons.

The

American Administration under John F. Kennedy was more
benevolent towards Indiafs policy of non-alignment and
recognised the importance of India to the future of Asia.
Moreover, China's attack on India in 1962 forced India to
repudiate its earlier entente with China, making India view
China in much the same way as the United States did.

With

China's attack of India in 1962, Indian and American
strategic perceptions, for the first time, merged, leading
to large scale assistance by the United States and the
expectation of closer long-term bilateral relations.

This

was due entirely to the fact that India's perceptions were
in tandem with US views on the threat of communist China,
thus making closer bilateral ties possible.

However, soon

after the threat of a resumption of conflict passed,
differences in perception between the two countries came to
the surface again, causing relations to return to their
earlier status quo.
The last case study, 1969-72, is an interesting example
of the United States' geopolitical objectives clashing with
India's regional security needs.

The United States "tilts"

towards Pakistan as the latter facilitates its opening to
China, an important geopolitical objective of the Nixon
Administration.

India, on the other hand, helped achieve

the liberation of Bangladesh, resulting in a war with
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Pakistan.

This war, moreover, threatened to disrupt the

United States' geopolitical design, leading to severely
strained relations between the United States and India.
As will become evident from the third study, India and
the United States had entirely different strategic
objectives born out of divergent interests, a factor that
caused the foreign policies of the two countries to encroach
upon the interests of each other.

Moreover, in keeping with

the hypothesis of this thesis, the divergence in strategic
perceptions and interests led to a period of extremely
strained Indo-US relations.
Thus, Indo-US relations between 1947 and 1972 can be
characterized as a series of alternating currents, sometimes
flowing harmoniously together and, at other times,
clashing.

The alternations caused by the divergent

perceptions and strategic interests of the two countries,
are: global aspirations vs. regional realities? security
pacts vs. non-alignment; friendship and convergence of
interests vs. alienation.
These are the themes of foreign policy which proved so
very difficult to align.

Only occasionally, and under

certain circumstances, was it to happen, despite best
intentions and high hopes on both sides.
We will return to these general observations in the
concluding chapter, but the next step in the development of
this argument is to review Indo-American relations as they
evolved after India's independence from the British in 1947.

CHAPTER ONE

To one analysing Indo-American relations as they
evolved after 1947, the maturing of these relations, in the
early years, appears as a painfully slow process completely
devoid of any constructive exchange of ideas and assessments
of the respective positions adopted by the two governments.
When viewed, however, in the light of the limited contacts
that the two sides had had with each other prior to 1947, it
is not surprising that the succeeding years were exhausted
in attempting to evaluate and understand each other1s
positions, with little apparent movement.

Thus, any attempt

at explaining the attitudes adopted by India and the United
States towards each other immediately after August 15, 1947,
necessitates a re-capitulation of the limited political
relations between the states in the pre-1947 period.
With the bombing of Pearl Harbour and America joining
the Allied cause in World War II, Americans were forced to
focus their attention on a country that had long been
considered Great Britain's problem.

Prior to 1942, although

liberal American journals had been sympathetic to the
position of the Indian National Congress and their
opposition to being dragged into a European war without any
guarantees of political benefits, the prevalent attitude
13
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remained that India was not of immediate American
concern.1
Until the summer of 1941, American reports of
developments in India were routed through London, an
inconvenience that did not necessarily reflect an unbiased
view of the state of the nationalist movement.

That year,

the Indian and American governments exchanged diplomatic
missions, an exchange that established diplomatic relations
although the Indian agent-general, Girja Shankar Bajpai, was
attached to the British embassy in Washington.

This proved

to be a crucial factor in influencing official American
opinion on India, an exchange that "served the American need
for more extensive, reliable, and direct information from
India and underscored to Indians, Americans, and the British
the official interest m

India."*

In August 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and
Prime Minister Winston Churchill issued the Atlantic
Charter, a declaration of war aims that later became the
focus of American ideological concern with Indian
nationalism.

The point most relevant to the Indian context

was the second clause of Article 3, which read, "and they
hope that sovereign rights and self-government may be
restored to those from whom it has been forcibly
removed."3

Whilst the Indian question was not on the

official agenda for talks between the two allied leaders,
the association of the Atlantic Charter with India came to
light when Churchill told the House of Commons that Article
3 did not apply to the British Empire.

He maintained that
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the article was directed at people under Nazi hegemony;
countries under allegiance to the British crown were not the
focus of the Atlantic Charter.

While liberal American

reaction to Churchill's speech reflected disillusionment and
demanded a response from Roosevelt, the President was not
forthcoming with his views on the subject, despite repeated
criticism of the British by Thomas Wilson, the American
representative in India.4
Coinciding with the attack on Pearl Harbour and
America's growing involvement with the war, and Indian
leaders' requests to Roosevelt to intervene on their behalf,
official American interest in British-Indian relations
increased substantially, culminating in the April 1942 Louis
Johnson mission to India as the President's "special
representative."5

Johnson, reflecting America's new

interest in the political developments of India's national
movement, attempted to mediate between the British
authorities and Indian nationalists in arriving at a
political settlement.
Earlier, although Churchill had reacted adversely to
Roosevelt questioning him on India when the former visited
Washington in December 1941, the American Government
continued to press their British counterparts to define a
positive approach towards solving the problems in India.6
Responding to Churchill's justification for continued
British presence in India because of the diversity of
religions and the inability of the Indian National Congress
to represent all groups, Roosevelt wrote a long letter to
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Churchill in which he drew parallels between the Indian
position and that of the American colonies immediately after
America's independence.

Urging the British to arrive at a

political settlement, he ended the letter by saying:

For the love of Heaven don't bring me into this,
although I do want to be of help.
It is, strictly
speaking, none of my business, except insofar as it
is a part and parcel of the successful fight you and
I are making.7
Johnson, on arriving in India, immersed himself in the
deliberations between the Indian leaders and the Cripps
mission that had arrived in India to negotiate a political
,

solution.

Q

.

.

By 1942, however, Indian affairs could not be

viewed independently of Japanese advances in Southeast Asia
and up to Burma, India's neighbour.

Johnson, viewing his

mission as an outcome of Roosevelt's obvious interest in
finding a solution for Indian independence, did his best to
prevent the negotiations from stalling, advising both
Stafford Cripps and the Indian leaders, even suggesting
alternatives to the original Cripps' proposal.9

Despite

Johnson's attempts to find a compromise solution, the talks
failed, however, and Churchill wrote to Roosevelt justifying
his attempts at having "proved the British desire to reach a
settlement."

Roosevelt, acting on Johnson's view that

Cripps' position in India had been undermined by both the
British viceroy in India and Churchill, replied:

... I am sorry to say that I cannot agree with this
point of view set forth in your message to me. ...
The feeling is almost universally held that that the
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deadlock has been caused by the unwillingness of the
British Government to concede to the Indians the
right of self government, notwithstanding the
willingness of the Indians to entrust technical,
military, and naval defense control to the competent
British authorities.10
Even though the Louis Johnson mission to India failed,
it is important to recognise it as the first public
demonstration of the Roosevelt Administation's genuine
interest in the Indian national movement.

It is evident

from the tone of Roosevelt*s letter that the US Government
disagreed entirely with the British position in India, but
it is pertinent to observe that the Americans, whilst
disagreeing on ideological grounds with their wartime ally,
were unable to press the point further because of the
greater importance of the threat that faced them, Japanese
advances in Asia.

The attempt, however, could not have been

entirely lost in the minds of the Indian nationalists?
Jawaharlal Nehru and Johnson were able to become friends,
and this effort undoubtedly contributed substantially to the
widespread belief "that the US government would be the most
helpful foreign agency in backing Congress objectives."11
During the rest of 1942, the Indian question, for the
United States, became entangled with the military effort.
As seen from the perspective of the Defense Department, the
security of India was vital to the preservation of Allied
control of the Middle East.

In spite of repeated urgings by

the press, US representatives in India, Chiang Kai-shek, and
a personal appeal from Gandhi, the Roosevelt Administration
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was reluctant to bring pressure to bear on Britain as long
as military planning remained the priority.12

Roosevelt

would only go so far as admitting to Gandhi the need for
Allied harmony, implicitly outlining the dilemma his
administration had been caught in and their inability to
focus their attention on the nationalist movement.
Thus, when the United States failed to support the
Indian national movement publicly at a time when Indian
leaders were being thrown into jail and their movement
violently suppressed, J the mutual distrust that was to
characterize so many of their later contacts, surfaced.
Congress leaders had come to view the United States as the
only nation capable of pressuring the British to find an
immediate solution, and when they found little public or
official support for their position, their view of the
United States soured.14
In December 1942, William Phillips was designated as
the President's personal representative to India.

Phillips'

experience and seniority within the diplomatic community
reflected Roosevelt's attempt to break the impasse that had
developed in India.

While Phillips conceived his role as

one of gaining the confidence of the various groups and of
becoming a center around which some of the problems might be
resolved, the British blunted his efforts by refusing him
permission to meet any of the jailed nationalist leaders.
Cordell Hull, the US Secretary of State, succinctly stated
the Administration's position when he said, "... on the
question of India, while the President is missing no

19

opportunities, we cannot do much if the British are
immovable."15
Concurrently, Phillips' silence and inability to
intercede was being viewed by Indians, unaware of his
petitions to the Viceroy, as a reflection of the U S '
superficial interest in India, further deepening the
mistrust developing in the Indian attitude towards the
United States.
Realising his inability to help alleviate the
situation, Phillips urged Roosevelt to allow him to return
to Washington, merely four months after his appointment.
Although Phillips submitted his resignation on his return to
Washington, it was not accepted until March 1945, even
though he never returned to India.

Phillips' anomolous status reflected Roosevelt's
uncertainty about Indian policy. To have accepted
Phillips' resignation earlier would have increased
Indian criticism, but to have dispatched Phillips
to India would have rekindled Indian hopes and
invited difficulties with the British.
From the departure of Phillips until the end of the
European war in May 1945, the US maintained a more distant
role in Indian developments.

Phillips was not followed by

another high ranking diplomat, a fact which probably
symbolized Roosevelt's acknowledgement that, owing to
Churchill's intransigience, assisting India was beyond
America's capability without risking Allied disharmony.
These, then, were the limited official contacts between
India and the United States under British India.

We move

20

now to the first of my case studies, the early tentative
appraisals and evaluations by independent India and the
United States between 1947 and 1954.
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CHAPTER TWO

The first of my case studies, the period between 1947
and 1954, is an analysis of the factors and issues that were
at play in giving Indo-US relations their initial shape and
form.

This chapter includes an analysis of the early

tentative appraisals, individual perceptions of common
global issues, and the search for common ground upon which
to build bilateral relations.

INDIA FASHIONS A POLICY
With the attainment of independence in August 1947,
India had to structure a foreign policy that would serve its
national interests as an independent country, rejecting, in
large measure, the foreign policy of its erstwhile British
rulers which had been fashioned around the interests of
British imperialism in Asia.

This was no easy task.

The

new Indian government had two distinct traditions in foreign
policy thinking.

The first was the policy they inherited

from the British, and the second was the ideas of the
leaders of the Congress party.

Although the Congress

government under Jawaharlal Nehru relied on their own
opinions and views in defining a policy for India, their
views were, indirectly, an outcome of their experiences
22
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under the British.
In the 192 0s and 1930s, the Congress party identified
India's political struggle with world movements against
imperialism and all forms of oppression.

It gave expression

to this view by supporting nationalist movements in other
countries, and with support for China which was under attack
by Japan in the mid 1930s.1

In addition, Britain had

successfully guaranteed India's security for the better part
of a century, making most Indians complacent and naive about
international issues and the threat of foreign attack.
Nehru, accepting Gandhi's philosophy that fear was the cause
of most wars, believed that if India avoided military
alignments and remained aloof from international conflicts,
there would be no reason to fear an attack on its borders,
and, more importantly, not much chance of getting involved
in a war.

This attitude, moreover, was essential, according

to Nehru, if independent India was to concentrate on
building the nation as, "without peace, all our dreams are
vanished and reduced to ashes."2
Although India's policy of non-alignment was
responsible for thrusting it forward into the international
arena in the early 1950s, it is inaccurate to state that
Nehru's government embraced this policy, as it later came to
be defined, as early as 1947.

India's desire to renounce

the power politics that was dividing the world into
ideological camps in the years of the Cold War was more the
result of a reaction against its colonial past than an
ideological commitment that recognised the benefits of
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non-alignment as a policy.

Proud of being the first Asians

to shake off their colonial rulers, Indians guarded their
independence with a zeal that obscured the realities of
international affairs.

Independence, to Nehru, meant more

than the departure of the British and the birth of an
independent nation ruled by an indigenous government.
Independence meant more than the culmination of a
nationalist movement to obtain freedom; it was the
perception of Indians, being recognised by the rest of the
world, as masters of their own destiny.

As Nehru told the

Constituent Assembly in 1948:
What does independence consist of? It consists
fundamentally and basically of foreign
relations.
That is the test of independence.
All else is local autonomy.
Once foreign
relations go out of your hand, into the charge
of somebody else, to that extent and in that
measure you are not independent.3
Independence, to Nehru, was the assertion of the principles
that constituted the term.
Born at a time when the world was divided into
antagonistic ideological camps, with states aligning
themselves with the two groups that constituted the bipolar
world, India's policy of keeping itself out of the Cold War
was bound to attract global attention.

Nehru had reasoned

that non-alignment was the best means of asserting India's
true independence, as well as achieving a stature of
significance in international affairs.4

In the late

1940s, however, whilst India attracted global attention as a
result of its unique status in the international community,
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the rapidly changing configuration of world politics denied
Nehru the niche he desired in global politics; the evolving
alignment of states into a bipolar system preoccupied the
time and attention of the major governments, and India
seemed to have no place in the evolving scheme.

The

benefits of non-alignment and its contribution to global
politics was not recognised until the 1950s.
In the interim, both the Soviet Union and Western
governments viewed India's policy of non-alignment as merely
a verbal exercise, and were skeptical of its supposedly true
intentions.

The Soviet Union saw India as essentially

committed to the West, an outcome made plausible by the
adoption of the constitutional system chosen by India, and
necessitated by economic needs.

The Soviets denounced the

Indian position as a policy of collaboration with British
imperialism, and, suspicious of everyone not completely on
their side, pressed India to make up its mind and refrain
c

from remaining aloof.

The United States, on the other

hand, was disappointed with India as it initially looked at
India as a candidate for the "free world", based primarily
upon the fact that both countries were democracies and upon
India's ties with the United Kingdom.6

Thus,

non-alignment in the 194 0s remained a policy that won India
few favours, and which, with the major governments of the
world doubting India's intentions, was perceived as an
academic posture that was bound to change to fit the
evolving structure of world politics.
In the period immediately after the attainment of
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independence, India's prestige was initially rather high in
the eyes of the American administration; its grappling with
monumental domestic problems and its active role in the
United Nations enhanced this prestige, although there was
official concern over India's policy towards Pakistan.7
In response to the growing antagonism between Pakistan and
India over the status of Kashmir, the US government decided
to adopt a neutral stance, rejecting the plea for military
assistance by Pakistan and adopting a similar approach to
the expected Indian demand.8
The Soviet Union was active in 1948 in directing the
Communist Party of India to rebellion,9 and American
officials were worried, as was the Indian government, about
communist advances in India through the local communist
party, a fear enhanced by the activities of the Soviet
Ambassador in New Delhi.10

The Soviets made it clear to

the Indian Ambassador in Moscow that they were not content
with India's intended lack of hostility; "the world is
divided into two great camps, the democratic and
imperialistic and it is now up to India to decide which side
she is going to take."11
The Soviets may not have been entirely wrong in being
skeptical of India's avowed policy of non-alignment.
Sarvepalli Gopal, Nehru's biographer, contends that Indian
non-alignment, in the early years, was clearly benevolent to
the West.

Probably as a result of Soviet pressure on

the Indian government, Nehru took it upon himself to clarify
to the United States, through diplomatic channels, that it
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was unthinkable for India to be on Russia"s side in the
event of a conflict between the two superpowers.13
In an interview with Michael Brecher, Krishna Menon, a
close confidante of Nehru's, argued that the genesis of
non-alignment was a desire to remain aloof from the
ideological conflict that was dividing the world in 1947.
He contends that the political benefits of this policy were
not realised till much later, as was the contribution India
could make in international disputes.14

In the light of

this argument— India did not align itself with either bloc
because it did not share the fundamental reasons that were
responsible for their creation— it is easy to explain how
India, despite its proclaimed policy of non-alignment, was
closer to the West, thus understanding the wavering in
India's commitment to non-alignment.

The open hostility of

the Soviet Union and the conflict with the Communist Party
of India were only some of the more obvious factors.
India's military weakness, its economic dependence on the
West, and the spill-over of India's conflict with Pakistan
over the status of Kashmir were all powerful factors that
pressured India to seek closer relations with Britain and
the United States.15
Despite its initial disappointment about the Indian
position on non-alignment, the United States seems to have
recognised Indian fears regarding the Soviet Union and its
ties with the Indian communists.

It is safe to presume that

Americans were also aware that India leaned closer to the
West than towards the Soviet Union, but, in the late 1940s,
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Indo-US relations were stagnant in that no major policies
were initiated by either government.

India, as mentioned

earlier, had told the American government that it was
unlikely to be on the Soviet*s side in the event of a
conflict; the American position, on the other hand, was
delivered to Girja Bajpai, Secretary General of India's
foreign office:
It was the considered opinion of the United
States Government that in the long term close
and friendly relations between India and the
United States was the anchor of stability of
the whole area from Africa to South East Asia.
Unfortunately, at the moment the United States
found it necessary to concentrate its efforts
and resources on resisting aggression in other
parts of the world.16
As mentioned earlier, one of the important factors that
led to the Indian government's clearly pro-Western stance in
foreign affairs stemmed from its need for Western economic
aid in developing the nation.

Substantial economic aid,

however, was not made available by the United States, the
only country in a position to assist India, a development
that seemed to irritate Nehru and strengthen his belief that
America, despite public proclamations to the contrary, was
evidently more interested in seeking closer relations with
"imperialists*' in Europe than in supporting the growing tide
on nationalism in Asia.17

As the Cold War progressed,

Indians were disappointed to observe that the United States
laid utmost emphasis on maintaining strong ties with
European colonial powers, ignoring, in the process, its
commitment to anti-colonialism.

Moreover, this seemed, to
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Indians, to be in keeping with their earlier limited
experiences with the US in the years of the nationalist
movement; Roosevelt would demonstrate interest and concern
for Indian nationalism, but refuse to press the issue with
Churchill when the latter adopted a strong stand against
Indian nationalism, effectively sacrificing his principles
to the American interest of maintaining cordial relations
with Britain.

THE UNITED STATES AS A SUPERPOWER
To a neutral observer, the Indian attitude, admittedly,
refused to recognise the United States1 position in global
politics and the inherent forces at play.

It is thus

pertinent, at this point, to analyse the American position
from a geo-strategic perspective in an attempt to understand
where and why India stood in their global outlook.
With the end of the Second World War, Americans were
forced to accept their position as a superpower, abandoning
the advice of their first President, George Washington, to
stay away from the politics that guided the destinies of
European nations.

Around the same time that India won its

freedom from the British in 1947, George F. Kennan was
appointed to the position of Director of the newly
constituted Policy Planning Staff charged with "formulating
and developing ... long-term programs for the achievement of
US foreign policy objectives."

Recognising that the United

States only had limited resources with which to fight Soviet
communist expansion, Kennan set about devising a strategy of
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containment, and it is now certain that Kennanfs
recommendations paralleled the thinking of the
administration he served from 1947 until well into
ip

1949. °

,

,

,

Kennan believed that American security could be

attained by ensuring that the four centers of industrial and
military power, the United States, the United Kingdom,
Germany and central Europe, and Japan, that were not under
the Soviet Union*s control did not fall under the domination
of Moscow.

It was the combination of industrial and

military power, which were concentrated in only these four
areas and the USSR, that could affect the global balance of
power, thus primary emphasis had to be maintained on the
defense of the four centers.

1Q

.
The difference
between the

policy recommended by Kennan and the earlier thinking of the
Truman Administration stemmed from the conviction that,
irrespective of the nature of the external threat, the
country only had limited resources with which to fight it.
Thus, "strongpoint defense" became the watchword of the
Truman Administration after 1947, concentating on the
defense of particular areas and the means of access to them,
rather than fighting communist expansion wherever it
appeared.

As John Lewis Gaddis states,
The "strongpoint" concept permitted
concentration on areas that were both
defensible and vital, without worrying too much
about the rest. The assumption was that not
all interests were of equal importance; that
the United States could tolerate the loss of
peripheral areas provided this did not impair
its ability to defend those that were
vital.20
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Having decided upon a strategy of asymmetrical
response, the United States categorized India as falling in
the group of countries on the Asian mainland, from
Afghanistan around to Korea, whose loss to the Soviet Union,
though regrettable, would not fundamentally alter the
balance of power and threaten American security.

On a

purely economic scale, the costs involved in defending the
area far outweighed the possible contribution it could make
to Soviet military capability, given the fact that the area
lacked both industrial and military capabilities that could
•

•

,

be of immediate use to the Soviets.

p i

The State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee,
in a report in April 1949, said:
The basic strategic objectives of the US, with
respect to South Asian countries are: ...
... (iii) to develop, without commitment to
military action on our part, a cooperative
attitude in these countries which would facilitate
obtaining the use of areas or facilities which
might be required by the Western democracies ...
for military operations against the USSR in the
event of war.22
India, however, was not asking for military protection
by the United States.

Whilst Indians like to believe that

non-alignment deprived the US of an important ally in the
1940s, this is not wholly in keeping with the facts.
Americans may have been disappointed with the policy of
non-alignment because that prevented India from publicly
joining the chorus castigating the Soviet Union, but
Kennan*s policy of containment clearly recommended that the
United States remain aloof from military commitments in the
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region, a recommendation the Administration followed, as
evidenced by the policy statement quoted above.
Indian disillusionment resulted from the lack of
financial assistance they had hoped for from the United
States.

The Indian tendency to equate the US with

"imperialists" and "colonial" powers in Europe was based
primarily on the resentment that America had a Marshall Plan
for Europe, but nothing for the poor nations of Asia.23
The reason, it appears, was a lack of understanding and
appreciation of the American necessity for initiating the
Marshall Plan, their obsession with the Soviet Union, and
the fact that even the United States, the richest nation in
the world, could be strapped for funds.

I do not think it

is pesumptuous to argue that this lack of appreciation by
India lay in the fact that the contacts between the two
countries were new, thus limited in that a mutual mistrust
existed, and that India had initially expected substantial
economic assistance from America, the absence of which
proved to be most disappointing.

NEHRU VISITS WASHINGTON. 1949
It was primarily the recognition of the importance of
close relations with the United States that prompted Nehru
to accept President Truman's long-standing invitation to
visit the United States in 1949.

That Nehru appreciated the

importance of his visit in attempting to transform relations
from a level of cordiality to the entente he desired is
evident from his frame of mind in preparing for the visit.
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"Why not," Nehru asked Krishna Menon somewhat rhetorically,
"align with the United States somewhat and build up our
• .
economic and military
strength?" on

The official talks, unfortunately, were far from
successful.

Considerable time was spent in exploring a

solution to the problem in Kashmir, an issue on which
Nehru's views were intractable, and US actions, as part of
the United Nations Commission to arrange a truce between
India and Pakistan, piqued the Indian Prime Minister.26
Truman had written to both Indian and Pakistani prime
ministers urging them to accept the commission's
recommendations, but Nehru viewed the American position as
unfair to India.26

The Americans, on the other hand,

disagreed with Nehru on his assessment of events in China,
and resented India's early recognition of the new communist
government, which was clearly in the offing.

Ambassador

Jessup, of the US delegation to the UN, argued that there
were many areas in China that were still under the control
of the Kuomintang and that Indian recognition of the
communists was premature.27

Nehru felt the Americans were

stalling at a time when it was evident that the Kuomintang
had lost to the communist rebels, but admitted to Truman
that India's proximity to China favoured early
• «
pc
,
,
recognition. ° As for economic assistance, Ambassador Loy
W. Henderson, the US representative in India, had informed
the Indian delegation that Truman was prepared to give India
anything that Nehru asked for? Nehru, however, would do no
more than state India's requirements of food and commodities
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in general terms.

The result was that at a time when there

was a glut of wheat in American markets, India was not even
offered special terms, let alone the gift of a million tons
oQ
that was widely expected.
At about the same time as Nehru's visit to the United
States, India's position on non-alignment began to shift
from a pragmatic stand to a more ideological one.
Previously, India's world views could be predicted according
to the issue at hand? when it came to matters related to any
form of oppression— colonial, economic imperialism, or
racial— India could be expected to denounce it in all its
manifestations.

On issues related to

India had preferred to remain neutral

the Cold War, however,
and distant.

In

America, Nehru explained to the public that non-alignment
did not exclude commitment to principles, and that India's
detachment in the Cold War did not imply isolation and
indifference on basic issues.

In Nehru's words,30

... Where freedom is menaced or justice threatened
or where aggression takes place, we cannot and
shall not be threatened. ... When Man's liberty or
peace is in danger we cannot and shall not be
neutral? neutrality would be a betrayal of what we
have fought for and stand for.
In spite of Nehru's clarifications to the American
public about the meaning of non-alignment and India's
position on the ideological conflict of the time, Indian and
American leaders parted in 1949 acknowledging that their
policies and assessments diverged in fundamental ways.
Nehru's visit reinforced the widespread view that, in spite
of shared political traditions and commitments to democratic
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principles, the two countries were committed to separate
postures in the global political arena.
As a result, the US could not firmly reinforce
India*s primary international objective, the
eradication of colonialism; and India was unwilling
to support the paramount American goal, the
containment of communism.
As Dean Acheson, the US Secretary of State, summing up
the despondency at the failure of the talks, said, "[Nehru]
was so important to India and India's survival so important
to all of us, that if he did not exist— as Voltaire said of
God— he would have to be invented."32

But why was there

general recognition in 1949 that the two countries' policies
and assessments diverged in fundamental ways?

DIVERGENT STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES
Nehru, in a report in early 1950, wrote, "If there is a
world war, there is no possibility of India lining up with
the Soviet Union whatever else she may do."33

On the

surface, this sentence reflects the kind of rhetoric the US
would have liked to hear from the Indians.

The two

countries disagreed, nevertheless, not at the level of
action, but over the perception of the threat, the
expansionary nature of international communism, and, as a
consequence, over the appropriate response to that threat.
Nehru was convinced that the American response in
concentrating on rigid military blocs and relying on
ideological dogma was the wrong way to ward off the
communist threat.

He reasoned that the approach ought to be
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less direct, although he did recommend resorting to other
means if faced with aggression.34

The US, on the other

hand, was apt to disregard Nehru*s attitude, guoted above,
as nothing more than benevolent neutralism.

Analysing

America's reaction to Indian attitudes, Heimsath and
Mansingh wrote:
India's government betrayed its democratic
political heritage, refused to face the challenges
of the real world of power, and knowingly increased
the prestige of "international communism" by
refusing to align itself with Western policies and
frequently criticizing the US.
In the great
struggle of ideologies India refused to commit
itself; in the division of world opinion, the
"battle for men's minds," in which every
government, ultimately every person could be
counted, India appeared to hold back.
Such a
wavering and indecisive posture could be called
"immoral." At the very least it seemed unfriendly,
at a time when the world's most powerful state
"needed all the friends it could get" and
unpopularity seemed the harbinger of defeat.35
The fall of China to a communist government in 1949-50
is an important case in attempting to understand the
divergence in policies and assessments between the US and
India.

It had been a fundamental objective of the Indian

government's foreign policy to see the elimination of
Western presence in Asia and to achieve the establishment of
a grouping of states to promote distinctly Asian
interests.36

India, as the first Asian nation to win

independence, had hoped to spearhead this movement.

This

policy, however, was destined to clash with traditional
American objectives in Asia.

The Americans, at the end of

the Second World War, had hoped to continue their alliance
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with China, strengthening the latter to promote US
objectives m

the region. 37

The success of the communist

rebels and the formation of a People's government, however,
was to lead to a re-evaluation of US strategy and the
attempt to find an alternative to Chiang Kai-shek on the
Asian mainland.
The shocks of 1949— principally the loss of China to
communism and the Soviet atomic bomb— led the Truman
Administration to repudiate Kennan's strategy of
containment, replaced instead by NSC-68 in 1950.

The

industrial-military combination that determined the
strongpoint defense strategy of Kennan gave way to the need
to uphold the credibility of the American response, with
"perceptions" of power beginning to be of vital importance.
Thus, NSC-68 recommended perimeter defense, responding
wherever the Russians chose to challenge American
interests.38
In December 1950, a Department of State Policy
Statement suggested:
With China under Communist domination, Soviet power
now encroaches along the perimeter of the Indian
sub-continent. India has become the pivotal state
in non-Communist
Asia • by virtue O Qof its relative
•
•
power, stability and influence.
Another policy statement proposed by the National Security
Council stated even more specifically:
The loss of India to the Communist orbit would mean
that for all practical purposes all of Asia will
have been lost; this would constitute a serious
threat to the security position of the United
States.
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Read in the light of the new American strategy of perimeter
defense, it is apparent that the United States was beginning
to look upon India as an alternative to China as its main
Asian ally.
This, however, was in direct contrast to Indian
interests.

Whilst the United States desired to stem the

spread of communist growth and inhibit the development of
Chinese power, India was seeking closer ties with China in
pursuit of its Asian objectives.

China had, verbally at

least, identified itself with a traditional Indian aim, the
withdrawal of Western colonial presence from Asia.
Moreover, whilst America was antagonistic towards China
because it viewed communist expansion in China as Soviet
sponsored, Nehru did not share this opinion.

The new

Chinese government had come to power in their own way,
largely as a result of the ineptitude of the Kuomintang
regime.

Nehru believed that China did not share Russia's

aggressive view on international communism, and, having won
power independently, the new Chinese government would
concentrate on national development rather than be a mere
camp follower of the Soviets on international issues;
China's size made Russian control over it impossible.
Further, Nehru strongly argued for the early recognition of
the new Chinese government, as all acts of hostility would
only serve to encourage closer ties between China and the
Soviet U n i o n . F i n a l l y ,

the US policy of viewing India

as a prospective alternative to China for its Asian strategy
opposed the tenets of non-alignment, a policy India was
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beginning to realise could play a positive role in
international issues beyond the mere posturing it had
allowed India to achieve immediately after independence.
Thus, by 1950, the US and India had come tp recognise
the fact that the interests of one did not necessarily
reflect the interests of the other, however regrettable that
may have been.

Although they shared democratic traditions

and thought on similar lines on issues like liberty,
justice, the pursuit of happiness, and freedom from
oppression, their divergent experiences and needs brought to
the surface their differences on assessments and interests.
And, in the final analysis, relations between the two
countries hinged on their attitudes and views on
international issues, a gap that was difficult to bridge,
given the divergence in the priorities of interest that
determined the nature of each country"s foreign relations.
Containment of Soviet communist expansion was the
corner-stone of American foreign policy, and if India was to
find a niche for itself in the eyes of the US' strategic
doctrine, it had to identify with American interests and
priorities.

But India was a new nation, a nation that did

not share the ideological dilemma that was dividing Europe
and the Western world.

Even on the spread of communist

influence in Asia, India's assessments differed from those
of the United States.

The rise to power of a People's

government in China was, to Indians, a manifestation of
nationalist pride and desires, not the long arm of
international communism, spearheaded by its flag-bearer, the
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USSR.

The Cold War remained a derivative of Western

historical experience, a power struggle with whose reasons
India could not identify.

Having been a colony of the

British empire for almost two centuries, India's foreign
policy strove to achieve the two fundamental features of
Asian nationalism and Asian pride in a world that was still
defined from a Western perspective.

Perhaps, the Indian

government reasoned, non-alignment would help keep Asian
nations away from the divisions of the Western world,
providing newly independent nations with a vehicle with
which to be heard and noticed on the global stage.

"India

could not be a mere hanger-on of any country or group of
nations; her freedom and growth would make a vital
difference to Asia and therefore the world," Nehru had
written in 1944.42

"Far too long have we been petitioners

in western courts and chancellories.
belong to the past.

That story must now

We propose to stand on our own feet ...

we do not intend to be playthings of others," the Indian
Prime Minister said five months before independence.43
Yes, India required American assistance in building the
nation, and this was an important priority of the new
government.

But independence was a novelty, a dream that

had kept the nationalist movement alive when all the odds
were against its survival.

Having won independence, the

dreams of the nationalist movement were transformed into
principles that were to determine policies, both at home and
abroad.

Under these circumstances, how was it possible for

India to compromise on her dreams when victory seemed so
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near, and ally with the United States, when the specific
foreign policy objectives of the two countries stemmed from
different roots?

Thus, non-alignment was viewed as

"immoral" by Americans, and Indians, unable to understand
America's pre-occupation with fighting the Soviet "threat",
remained disillusioned over the lack of understanding shown
to them.

KOREA AS A CATALYST
After Nehru's return from the United States, relations
with the Truman Administration got worse than ever, but
Nehru was careful to ensure that the stand-offishness of the
US did not compel India to draw closer to the Soviet Union
and destroy all ties with the Western world, for he was
still very wary of Soviet behaviour.44

Ambassador

Henderson, analysing the Indian government's attitude, wrote
to Acheson:
... criticism expressed in the press or orally, of
US government or people upon which Indians when
irritated with the US are accustomed to dwell,
including our treatment of American Negroes, our
tendency to support colonialism and to strive for
continued world supremacy of white peoples, our
economic imperialism. ...45
The Truman Administration was becoming increasingly annoyed
over the lack of understanding by the Indians of the strain
America's commitment to Europe placed on its economy.
Moreover, Indian insistence on no strings being attached to
any assistance, particularly at a time when the US required
support in Asia, precluded the feasibility of American tax
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money being provided without any tangible benefits.

It was

Acheson's opinion that friendly relations had to hinge on
something more substantial and enduring than "millions of
•

A

fi

tons of wheat, dollar loans, or gifts." °

Henderson,

however, was convinced that the only possible way for the
two countries to grow closer was if America provided
substantial economic aid, or if international communism
began fresh adventures in India, scaring the Indian leaders
into turning to the United States.47

Nothing else, it

seemed, would prevent the current drift to change, with
India continuing to denounce the United States, when
irritated, publicising, in the process, its independent
approach to foreign policy.
With the outbreak of war in Korea in June 1950, India
and the United States were to find themselves locked in
vigorous disagreement with each other, often representing
ideological extremes.

Much of this disagreement emanated

from the chambers of the United Nations for the world to
hear, but this contest of ideas and beliefs had its
advantages too.

It provided each country with an

opportunity to size the other up, as well as understand the
other's political beliefs, providing, in the long term, a
more mature understanding of the other's foreign policy.
India's diplomatic efforts at finding a solution to the
crisis in Korea gained for itself greater understanding of
non-alignment in the United States, but not before there had
been considerable resentment expressed at the seemingly
anti-American posture adopted by India with respect to the

43

former*s position in Korea.
India's efforts to seat the People's Republic of China
in the United Nations, and to convince the Soviet Union to
return to the Security Council, provided it with a degree of
credibility with the communist powers, thus making it
possible for India to act as an arbiter on issues in Korea.
Recognising this, the United States requested Nehru to warn
China that it was against its interests to attack Formosa or
get involved in the fighting in Korea, and not to react to
,
,
AO
American successes m the peninsula. ° Nehru appealed to
the Chinese Premier, Chou En-lai, to be patient and not
react to events, but this appeal was thwarted by the Western
powers who, believing that the Soviet Union and not China
was the main opponent, crossed the 38th parallel, prompting
Chinese "volunteers" to cross the Manchurian border.
It appeared, then, that the phase when Nehru could use
his influence with China was over.

The US was critical of

India's repeated calls for restraint, and for mobilising
support to gain admission for China into the United Nations
•

•

o

at a time of crisis.

A Q

Nehru, speaking to Ambassador

Henderson, explained that the Government of India did not
believe that the Chinese were expansionist or had aggressive
designs against other countries in Asia; China intervened in
Korea because it believed the US wanted to use Korea as a
base for subsequent invasions into China.50

The Western

attitude was summed up by the British at the Commonwealth
meeting in London: they believed that China and Russia were
acting together; the strategy was for China to tie down
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large armies of the West in Korea while the Soviets would
neutralize Germany and make advances in Europe.51
Whatever the' true facts surrounding the conflict in
Korea may be, the important factor to this thesis is the
continuing Indian inability to appreciate American security
concerns in Asia.

As Chester Bowles, an American Ambassador

to India who was able to develop close relations with the
Indian Prime Minister, explained to Nehru, India was harping
too much on fighting nineteenth century imperialism which
was already dead, or dying, while underestimating the power
of the new Russian imperialism, led by the world communist
movement.52

India*s ideological position was manifested

further in an episode symbolic of the divergence in the
countries* policies, the signing of the Japanese peace
treaty in San Francisco in 1951.

The treaty draft was

circulated to some fifty-odd countries still technically at
war with Japan, but India had two objections: the failure to
recognise complete Japanese sovereignty (Ryuku and Bonin
islands remained under American administration), and the
failure to specify the return of Formosa to the People's
Republic of China, thus making the treaty obviously
unacceptable to the latter.53

India made its objections

public by boycotting the ceremony in San Francisco, but, in
retrospect, it appears naive of Nehru, the architect of
India's foreign policy, to have expected the United States
to compromise on a vital issue regarding its Far Eastern
strategy.

That, in essence, was the stumbling block in

Indo-US relations in the late 1940s and early 1950s.
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In early 1952, Bowles and Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt
encouraged Nehru to resume active negotiations to break the
impasse that had developed over issues in Korea. Responding
to this, Nehru sent Krishna Menon to the UN to deal with the
Korean question, eventually negotiating a settlement for the
repatriation of prisoners by establishing a commission, led
by an Indian, to act as a neutral arbiter.

India1s

diplomatic role earned for itself a greater appreciation and
understanding of non-alignment in the United States, but,
unfortunately, there was no similar appreciation by India of
the US 1 interests.54

NAILING THE COFFIN
The Korean war served as a catalyst for the United
States in defining a clear strategy to fight communist
expansion in Asia.

NSC-68 had recommended perimeter

defense, and with the loss of China to communist domination,
the Soviet "threat” now encroached along the perimeter of
the Indian sub-continent.

A policy statement by the

National Security Council declared in 1951:

... the loss of China, the immediate threat to
Indochina and the balance of Southeast Asia, the
invasion of Tibet, and the reverses in Korea have
greatly increased the significance to the US of the
political strategic manpower and resource potential
of the countries of South Asia and made it more
important that this potential be marshalled on the
side of the US.
India, especially, and Pakistan as
well, possess leaders having great prestige
throughout the whole of Asia; the future support of
these countries diplomatically and in the United
Nations is of great importance; India in particular
has certain strategic materials of importance to
our national defense; . .. 4
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As mentioned earlier, the US was viewing India as an
alternative to China as the main ally of the United States
in Asia.

However, concurrently, India stated its Asian

objectives as mutual identity of purpose with China,
vis-a-vis Asia, thus excluding India from the list of
potential American allies in Asia.

Ambassador Bowles, too,

was of the opinion that nothing short of a dramatic change
in the global political situation could force India to
repudiate its "neutrality” on issues related to the Cold War
and military alignments.55

Thus, there was, for the

United States, only one course of action left to pursue: it
could exert influence through "smaller, peripheral states,"
many of whom feared the power of China and India.56
Selig Harrison argues that the genesis of Pakistan*s
military alliance lay in the ideas of a retired civil
servant of the British Raj, Sir Olaf Caroe.57

Caroe, in

his book, Wells of Power, argued that, with partition, India
was no longer the logical base for Middle Eastern defense.
Pakistan, on the other hand, lay well within the grouping of
Southwestern Asia.

It appears, however, somewhat naive to

assume that the diplomatic and military policy makers in
Washington were unable to judge for themselves Pakistan*s
potential as an American ally, and had to rely instead on
the advice of Caroe.

Caroe, moreover, had been arguing that

Pakistan, not India, was the logical base for both
Southwestern Asia and the Sino-Soviet land mass.
M.S. Venkataramani, a scholar of Indo-US relations,
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provides substantial evidence to illustrate America *s early
preference for India as a more favoured nation, including
the fact that it was Nehru, not the Pakistani Prime
Minister, who was first invited to Washington.58

I tend

to agree with Heimsath and Mansingh's view that it was
India*s commitment to non-alignment, re-inforced in the
1950-53 period, that prompted the Americans to turn to
'*smaller, peripheral states11 to act as a bulwark against
communism.

Further, numerous policy statements drawn up by

the National Security Council and Armed Force's committees,
quoted earlier, all explicitly stated preference for India
as the "pivotal state" in resisting communism.
Thus, India's decision to reject the military
alignments that characterized the bipolar world led to a US
military alliance with Pakistan in 1954, the ground work for
which began in the twilight years of the Truman
Administration.

Pakistan and India, however, shared an

uneasy, antagonistic relationship, and the Government of
India was apt to view any change in the regional balance of
power as an act of hostility against it.

This alliance

brought forth two principal complaints from the Indian
government.

First, Pakistan's alliance with the United

States fractured the geographic solidity of the non-aligned
grouping of states, bringing the Cold War into what Nehru
had hoped would be the "no war" area of Asia. By allying
itself with Pakistan, the United States was bringing the
Cold War to India's borders.

Second, the US-Pakistani

alliance resembled nineteenth century imperialism, where a
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relatively weak power accepted foreign military assistance
to increase its own strength, gradually losing independence
and providing a launching pad to spread alien influence into
RQ
•
.
neighbouring countries. ^ Nehru's second objection was,
admittedly, an outdated analogy, but one that mirrored the
fears of a nation still only seven years old.

Apart from

increasing the strategic vulnerability of India vis-a-vis
Pakistan, the US Administration's decision to spawn military
alliances on the Asian mainland was, in essence, the end of
Nehru's vision of a "no war" Asia that could, through a
loose grouping of Asian federations, voice distinctly Asian
interests in the global arena.

For the US, however, it was

a guestion of filling the vaccuum on the Asian mainland. The
land mass from Turkey to the Philippines, while on the
southern flank of the communist area of influence, was
unprotected by any Western-oriented forces.

Apart from

troops in Korea, there were no American troops on the entire
Asian mainland.
President Dwight Eisenhower, attempting to explian
American security needs, wrote to Nehru in February 1954:
Our two Governments have agreed that our desires
for peace are in accord.
It has also been
understood that if our interpretation of existing
circumstances and our belief in how to achieve
goals differ, it is the right and duty of sovereign
nations to make their own decisions ... What we are
proposing to do, and what Pakistan is agreeing to
do, is not directed in any way against India. And
I am confirming publicly that if our aid to any
country, including Pakistan, is misused and
directed against another in aggression I will
undertake immediately, in accordance with my
constitutional authority, appropriate action both
within and without the UN to thwart such
aggression.
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Despite Eisenhower's assurances, the Indian government's
position towards the United States hardened.

Recognising

that there had always been substantial differences of
opinion, this growing apart was essentially due to the
strengthening of Pakistan militarily, and America's policy
of collective defense through military alignments within
India's sphere of strategic interest, South and Southeast
zr -i

,

,

Asia.
Later that year, US government officials were
j
concerned that relations had deteriorated sufficiently for
Eisenhower to intervene personally and invite the Indian
Prime Minister to Washington.

Eventually, the President

wrote once again to Nehru:
What really counts is that there be common ground
on which we can work out mutual problems and
minimize differences.
I believe the United States
and India have such common ground in abundance.
I
do not consider that our differences in approach
constitute any bar to growing friendship and
cooperation between our two countries.
The damage, however, had been done.

American security

needs had clashed with Indian interests and objectives.
While the United States and India had never shared common
strategic perceptions and needs, America's decision to build
allies on the Asian mainland fractured India's Asian
objectives.

Of even greater damage, moreover, was the

United States' decision to build Pakistan's military
strength, an act that was considered positively unfriendly
to India, given the antagonistic relationship between the
two countries of the subcontinent.
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As is clearly evident from this analysis, the divergent
global perspectives adopted by India and the United States
were the result of different historical experiences and
geographical locations, as well as the result of the
difference in size between the two countries.

Moulded as it

was by the international strategic environment, since India
could not share America*s global perspective or interests,
there was little substance upon which to build close
bilateral relations, despite common declared long term
interests and objectives.

Thus, the United States entered a

military alliance with Pakistan, a development that was
looked upon by India as encroaching upon her security
interests.
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CHAPTER THREE

This second period, the years between 1961 and 1965,
provides an interesting contrast to the first study.

This

chapter begins with an appreciation of John Kennedy's views
on the Third World, in general, and India, in particular,
highlighting the difference from the perspective of the
Eisenhower Administration.

This chapter also includes the

effect China's attack on India in 1962 had on the latter's
foreign policy, India's subsequent appeal to the United
States, and the immediate years after the 1962 war.

JOHN F. KENNEDY
Senator John F. Kennedy's announcement, in early 19 60,
that he had chosen Chester Bowles as his chief advisor on
foreign policy ought, in retrospect, to have served as
warning that, if elected President, a Kennedy
Administration would herald a shift in foreign policy for
Asia, in general, and India, in particular.

Bowles had

served as President Truman's Ambassador to New Delhi
between 1951 and 1953, and was a vocal critic of the
Eisenhower Administration's decision to include Pakistan in
the newly created military alliances of SEATO and CENTO.
Bowles had, for almost a decade, strongly and consistently
54
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opposed American policy in Asia which was based primarily,
as he saw it, on military alliances with several rightist
Asian governments.1

He had, as Ambassador to New Delhi,

urged that India be recognised, along with Japan, as the
United States' "bridge" to the East.

This could be

accomplished, he argued, by strong American support for
India's five-year plan, winning India's friendship and
understanding.

"A dynamic, stable India and friendly

Japan," he recommended, "can provide two crucial anchors
for the whole vast territory from South Africa to the
Aleutians.

... The balance of power and influence would be

tipped sharply in our direction."
Even though Kennedy was deeply concerned with the
conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, he
did not attribute all mankind's troubles to this conflict.
As Arthur Schlesinger noted, "in 1961 this was still rather
.

.

.

o

a novel viewpoint for an American President."*^

Holding

the view that the battle for Europe, except for Berlin, had
essentially been won by the end of the 1940s, Kennedy was
of the opinion that the battleground between democracy and
communism had shifted to the Third World countries of Asia,
Africa and Latin America.4

This, however, was contrary

to the policy he inherited as President, a policy deeply
entrenched in the world of government and bureaucracy.
There had been a tendency in the years after the
Second World War, including the 1950s, to view the world as
neatly divided in the ideological conflict between America
and the Soviet Union.

Countries that did not fit into the
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two categories of "communist” and "free world" were
regarded as anomolies in a highly ideological planet.

John

Foster Dulles, Eisenhower*s Secretary of State, had aspired
to encircle the Soviet Union and China with a ring of
states aligned with the United States, with the hope that
this would discourage Soviet and Chinese attacks and
further communist advances.5

To achieve this Dulles had

attempted to recruit the Third World nations of Asia to
align themselves with the United States through treaties
and unilateral declarations— SEATO, CENTO, bilateral
security pacts with South Korea and Taiwan, and
Congressional resolutions on Taiwan and the Middle East.
Countries like India, however, which chose to be neutral
and removed from the ideological crusade of the times, were
viewed as "immoral."

In an ideological struggle as intense

as the Cold War, there was, for Dulles, no room for middle
ground.

Neutrality, to Dulles, was "an immoral and

short-sighted conception.1,6

As Schlesinger, summing up

Dulles* creed, wrote:
If they declined to ally themselves to the United
States or went their own way in the United Nations
or indulged in tirades against the west or engaged
in social revolution, it was due to inherent moral
weakness compounded by the unsleeping activities
of the minions of a Communist Satan.
There was, in other words, an inherent belief in the
American government that those countries who were not with
us were necessarily against us.
Kennedy, on the other hand, was of the view that
neutral nations were as naturally indifferent to the
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"moral” issues of the Cold War as the United States had
been to political developments in Europe at a comparable
stage of growth.

As he said in 1959:

The desire to be independent and free carries with
it the desire not to become engaged as a satellite
of the Soviet Union or too closely allied to the
United States. We have to live with that, and if
neutrality is the result of concentrating on
internal problems, raising the standard of living
of the people and so on, particularly in the
under-developed countries, I would accept that.
It's part of our own history for over a hundred
years.8
Thus, while Dulles opposed neutrality and regarded neutral
nations as essentially committed to the "other" side,
Kennedy, by making national independence the crucial issue
in his foreign policy for the Third World, encouraged
neutral Third World countries to be benevolent towards the
United States because of their common stake in resisting
the threat of communist totalitarianism.
India, more specifically, was regarded by Kennedy as
"the key area" in Asia, a country that, of all neutral
nations, he was most interested in.

Kennedy had visited

India with his brother Robert in 1951, and believed that
the struggle between India and China for the economic and
political leadership of the East would determine the future
of Asia.

It is interesting to note, at this point, how

Kennedy's views on India co-incided with those of another
Democratic politician, Bowles.

Whilst still a Senator,

Kennedy, with Bowles in the House of Representatives, had
introduced a resolution in Congress calling for a joint
European-American financial effort to support India's
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five-year economic plan.

Introducing the resolution, he

said, "If China succeeds and India fails, the
economic-development balance will shift against us."
Regarding India's commitment to its policy of
non-alignment, he went on to say, "Let us remember that our
nation also during the period of its formative growth
adopted a policy of noninvolvement in the great
international controversies of the nineteenth century."9
Thus, because of Kennedy's long standing interest in
and support for India, his election as President was met
•
•
. . .
with
considerable
optimism
m

. i
India.

n

Moreover,

Kennedy's choices of Bowles as his Undersecretary of State
and John Kenneth Galbraith as Ambassador to India
undoubtedly served as an indication of the importance
President Kennedy placed on relations with India.
Schlesinger wrote that "in sending Galbraith as his
ambassador to New Delhi, Kennedy deliberately chose a man
who could be depended upon to bring to Indian problems his
own mixture of sympathy and irony."11

KENNEDY'S WORST VISIT. 1961
On assuming his duties as Ambassador to New Delhi,
Galbraith felt the best way of erasing memories of Dulles'
isolation of India was to expose the Indian Prime Minister
to the new President.12

Although unhappy at the Bay of

Pigs adventure, the two governments had worked in tandem in
the Congo,13 and Nehru, at Kennedy's request, had
intervened with Hanoi and Moscow to arrange a cease-fire in
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Laos.14

Kennedy was extremely grateful for India’s

assistance in Laos, and even committed himself to assist
India's economic development.

Nehru appreciated Kennedy's

goodwill and stated in Parliament that the new American
Administration was more friendly to India than its
predecessor had been.
However, despite general acceptance by the two leaders
that relations between the two countries were on the
threshold of a major breakthrough, Nehru's visit to the
United States in November 1961 was not a success.

Arthur

Schlesinger guotes the President describing the visit as "a
disaster ... the worst head-of-state visit I have
16
had."xo

•

The American assessment was that Nehru was a

tired old man who had stayed around too long.17

The

Indian delegation, on the other hand, was in something of a
dilemma.

Kennedy had won the election by an extremely

narrow margin and appeared insecure in his handling of
power.

The Indian guests, moreover,

were aware of

differences between the White House and State Department
vis-a-vis India, and were troubled by the Bay of Pigs
fiasco.18
The two leaders talked about Laos, Vietnam, Kashmir,
the growing Sino-Indian border problem, and Pakistan, and
Galbraith records the meetings as a monologue by the
President as the Prime Minister simply did not respond on
most issues.19

While Nehru had already done what he had

been asked to do to secure Laotian neutrality and
independence, he did not want to join the American effort

60

in finding a solution in Vietnam.

Kennedy had earlier

indicated to M.C. Chagla, the retiring Indian Ambassador to
Washington, that he would have liked India to assume a
position of leadership in Southeast Asia against China, and
that he was willing to accept non-alignment of the area if
that was the outcome of Indian leadership.20

In the

United States, Kennedy once again pressed Nehru to help in
finding a solution for Vietnam, with methods ranging from
an approach by Nehru to Ho Chi Minh, a UN observer corps, a
stronger International Control Commission, and acceptance
of Indian leadership in establishing a neutral belt across
,
pi
,
Southeast Asia. x Apart from recommending that President
Diem of South Vietnam be urged to reform his
administration, the Indian delegation refused to even
consider any of the other proposals.

Nehru refused to

consider the sponsorship of a neutral Southeast Asia, for
it amounted to a virtual alliance, and the Indian team did
not think that any initiative was possible apart from the
proper working of the International Control Commission
under the Geneva Accords of 1954.22

While there is

confusion as to the reasons for Nehru's unusual reticence,
his reluctance to be drawn into any effort in Vietnam is
justified by what we now know.

During the course of these

discussions in the United States, plans to send a modest
8,000-man American military force were being drawn up at
the State Department.23
It is interesting to analyse, at this stage, why
Nehru's visit to the United States in 1961 is acknowledged
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by all to have been a complete failure, particularly in
light of the expectations that a meeting between the two
leaders had begun to evoke in the minds of others.
Kennedy's views on India's role in Asia have already been
discussed.

Nehru, it has also been noted, had been

impressed by Kennedy's commitment to India's economic
development as a Senator, and had publicly acknowledged the
thawing of Indo-US relations in the early months of the new
Democratic Administration.

It is evident from the

narrative of the talks between the two, described above,
that the stalemate appeared to arise over Southeast Asia.
Galbraith recorded that Nehru only seemed interested when
the talks focussed upon India's immediate geographic
vicinity.24

This is particularly intriguing when viewed

in the context of Nehru's views of Southeast Asia in the
early 1950s, which included his vision of an Asian
federation and no-war area devoid of Western colonial and
military presence.
It is obvious that Kennedy was agitated to find a
solution short of sending American military personnel to
Vietnam, and while Nehru responded negatively to all the
American suggestions on Vietnam, he continually re-iterated
that the US should not send troops to the area.25

But

the Americans required a realistic alternative, and this
Nehru refrained from providing.

The practicality and

effectiveness of a stronger International Control
Commission or a neutral belt across Southeast Asia is not
the subject of this thesis.

The intriguing question is why
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Nehru rejected the offer to sponsor such a solution,
knowing that an effort, even if a failure, would win
greater American goodwill and assistance for India, as
evidenced by the results of his diplomatic role in Laos.
Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia and Gamal Nasser of Egypt
had, earlier in 1961, been keen to convene a conference of
all non-aligned states.

Nehru felt that the conference,

whose purpose was to create a bloc or at least a platform
of like minded nations, would damage the concept of
non-alignment.

The essence of non-alignment was the

retention of freedom from pre-commitment; the creation of a
third bloc, a non-aligned one, contradicted this purpose.
Non-alignment, to Nehru, meant more than merely standing
aloof from the Soviet Union and the Western powers; it
included non-alignment with other countries as well.26
Nehru realised, however, that he could not stay away from
the meeting at Belgrade, but made his hesitation known and
guided the conference to be as broad based in its policies
and priorities as possible.
Visiting the United States a month after Belgrade,
Nehru possibly had the same hesitation in mind when he
opposed Indian leadership of a neutral Southeast Asia
because it virtually amounted to another military
alliance.

While the specific reason that prompted Nehru's

reluctance is unclear, I can only presume his hesitation
stemmed from the same ideological reasoning that
characterized his response to Nasser and Tito.
Be that as it may, Nehru, undoubtedly aware of the
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strategic value of Southeast Asia to the United States,
described in the previous chapter, allowed an opportunity
for the two countries to work in tandem in an area of
geo-strategic value, to pass.

Although relations between

the United States and India were not harmed by Nehru1s
reluctance to be drawn into closer global contact between
the two countries, Kennedy1s perceptions of India1s
potential greatness were altered.
Though Kennedy retained his belief in the
necessity of helping India achieve its economic
goals, he rather gave up hope, after seeing Nehru,
that India would be in the next years a great
affirmative force in the world or even in South
Asia.27
SINO-INDIAN BORDER WAR. 1962
While India and China had been locked in dispute over
their common Himalayan border since the early 1950s,28
the Chinese attack on the 20 October, 1962, caught the
world unprepared for any major fighting.

Coinciding with

the crisis over Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba, any
anticipation that a bilateral matter would develop into a
world crisis was soon shattered.

However, the day after

the Chinese attacked, the State Department declared that
the United States "was shocked at the violent and
aggressive action of the Chinese communists against India,"
and that any Indian request for aid "would be considered
sympathetically.1,29
The Soviet Union, preoccupied with events in Cuba, was
reluctant to get involved, but assumed a pro-Chinese
stance.

Similarly, leaders of other non-aligned nations,
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with the exception of Tito and Nasser, were guarded in
their responses.

The general reaction of other nations

shocked Nehru out of the complacence he had assumed with
the attainment of independence, even making him skeptical
about the faith he had placed in the inherent goodwill of
nations and the superiority of the ways of peace.30
These developments, coupled with a succession of quick
reverses suffered by Indian troops and the lack of
equipment, forced India to turn to any quarter to obtain
arms.31
President Kennedy’s offer of aid was communicated by
Galbraith to Nehru on 29 October, an offer that was
promptly accepted.

That Nehru was sensitive to the

political implications of this act is evident from two
episodes.

Speaking to Galbraith, Nehru mentioned that

while India did indeed require military aid, he hoped this
did not mean a military alliance between the United States
and India.32

Similarly, in delivering Nehru’s first

letter to Kennedy, Ambassador B.K. Nehru expressed the hope
that Kennedy would offer "support" instead of "military
assistance" on the basis of "sympathy" instead of an
"alliance."33

While it is evident that Nehru was

clinging to his ideological position of non-alignment at a
time of crisis, it was also a prudent political move.

He

did not want to irritate the Soviets, who realised that
military assistance from the United States was inevitable,
as he expected them to revert to their earlier attitude of
partiality to India once the Cuban crisis was

65

resolved.34

To America's eternal credit in Indian eyes,

though short lived as subsequent events proved, Kennedy
offered "support out of sympathy."
That America responded promptly to the Indian plea is
evident from the fact that the first load of military
equipment arrived in India merely four days after the
request was made.35

The initial airlift, worth several

million dollars, was extended to India under the terms of
the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act (section 503), which
empowered the President to draw upon existing stocks of US
weapons, in special situations, without prior Congressional
approval.

This airlift— essentialy of mobile weapons— was

completed on the 12 November.
Although the Prime Minister had warned the nation to
be prepared for further reverses, and the army instructed
to fight on terrain that was favourable to them and not
advantageous to the Chinese— as in the higher slopes of the
Himalayas— even Nehru was not ready for the rout that was
to follow.

On 17 November, the Indian commander of the

eastern sector sent a desperate message that the
superiority of the Chinese was so great that foreign troops
should be asked to come to India's aid. °

Within two

days, an advance to Leh in the west and the loss of the
entire northeast appeared inevitable, with the likelihood
that the Chinese would advance into the Indian plains.
The magnitude of the Chinese break-through resulted in
a state of panic and shock at all levels of Indian
decision-making.

Without apparently consulting any of his
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cabinet colleagues, apart from the bureaucratic chief of
the Foreign Office, M.J. Desai,37 Nehru sent Kennedy two
letters on 19 November.

Describing the situation as

"really desperate," the Indian Prime Minister
requested the immediate despatch of a minimum of
twelve squadrons of supersonic all-weather
fighters and the setting up of radar
communications. American personnel would have to
man these fighters and installations and protect
Indian cities from air attacks by the Chinese till
Indian personnel had been trained.
If possible,
the United States should also send planes flown by
American personnel to assist the Indian Air Force
in any battles with the Chinese in Indian air
space; but aerial action by India elsewhere would
be the responsibility of the Indian Air Force.
Nehru also asked for two B-47 bomber squadrons to
enable India to strike at Chinese bases and air
fields? but to learn to fly these planes Indian
pilots and technicians would be sent immediately
for training in the United States. All such
assistance and equipment would be utilised solely
against the Chinese.39
However, the United States lifted the naval blockade
of Cuba on 20 November, and the Chinese announced a
unilateral cease-fire on the 21st, with a withdrawal north
of the McMahon Line in the east and the "line of actual
control" in other sectors to follow in ten days.
The effect of Nehru's atypical response in requesting
direct American participation to resist the Chinese attack
was blunted by the Chinese decision to announce a
unilateral cease-fire two days after the request was made.
Ironically, it was, therefore, the Chinese who made it
possible for India to retain, technically at least, its
hallowed policy of non-alignment.

While critics can argue

that the request did, in essence, end any claims to
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non-alignment, the fact remains that Nehru*s potentially
momentous decision was never implemented, allowing India to
defend the legitimacy of its non-alignment.
Galbraith records that the United States did take the
Indian plea for "military association" very seriously.
Before the Chinese announcement of a cease-fire came
through later that night, Kennedy sent Galbraith a message
on 21 November indicating that he was prepared to help and
was sending a high-level mission to "assess the needs of
the Indians."

The message also contained the promise of

further equipment for the Indian defense effort, and the
proposal of three American teams to help run the war.4®
The day after the war ended, a large mission arrived in New
Delhi from Washington, headed by Averell Harriman.

It is

thus perfectly apparent that, although Nehru*s request for
military association was never implemented or completely
tested, the Kennedy Administration was actively considering
the Indian plea.

Even Michael Brecher notes that the US

Government was in the process of drafting a favourable
reply to Nehru’s request when the cease-fire was
announced.41
The question of greatest relevance to this thesis is
why the United States reacted so favourably to India’s
defense needs, particularly when it was concurrently
occupied by a more critical issue, the Cuban missile
crisis.

Nations do not offer foreign aid or conduct their

international relations for purely altruistic reasons, and
the United States was no exception.
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The India-China border war of 1962 provided the United
States with a rare opportunity to further its political
aims in a region of strategic importance.

American

relations with China had not improved since 1949, and
India1s need for assistance provided the Kennedy
Administration with an opportunity to consolidate America*s
position in the area.

Coming to India's aid would provide

greater influence over India, as well as a more pro-Western
version of non-alignment.

Moreover, it provided the United

States with a lever to pressure India to negotiate a
settlement over Kashmir, leading to greater Indo-Pakistani
cooperation with Western forces in facing the northern
communist bastion.
Galbraith noted in his diary that, on the evening of
2 0 November, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, sent him a long
message in response to Nehru's letter of the 19th.

It

asked several questions on pointedly political issues:
India's attitude to Pakistan, problems of communism in
South Asia, and the potential roles of the Commonwealth and
United Nations in brokering a solution for Kashmir.42
Even the Harriman Mission, the most visible expression of
American commitment to India in 1962, recorded:
Part of our mission was merely to demonstrate
United States support for India and so to send the
Chinese Communists a signal of deterrence.... But
beyond this emergency, further Chinese behavior
would depend on whether or not an effective
deterrent could be created in the sub-continent
... how India and Pakistan each assessed the
nature of the threat from Communist China ... and
whether they were willing to modify their
hostility toward each other.... The only effective
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defense of the sub-continent against such a threat
would be a joint defense by both India and
Pakistan standing together.43
Thus, while America's decision to assist India in 1962
can be viewed in the general context of President Kennedy's
policy of reversing Dulles' isolation of India by building
closer bilateral relations, the 1962 border war also
provided the Kennedy Administration with the means whereby
a larger American political objective could be
accomplished, that of opposing the communist countries to
India's immediate north.
in a variety of ways.

Moreover, this could be achieved

By reacting promptly to India's

needs, the United States could win the confidence of
India's political elite and the necessary influence to
result in changes that would make Indian foreign policy
more sympathetic to the American view of the world.44
Or, as Galbraith noted, the political benefits of military
aid and an air defense pact had the ingredients of major
implications for long-term Indo-American relations.45
However, the "joint defense of the sub-continent,"
envisaged by the Harriman Mission, hinged on the issue of
settling the dispute over Kashmir between India and
Pakistan.

It is easy to understand why the United States

required this political development before commiting itself
to an effective defense of the subcontinent against Chinese
attacks: military assistance would have to be directed
against the Communist threat, not frittered away in
settling old scores.

But when the Chinese attacked India
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in October 1962, Pakistan made no secret of its bias
against India and support for China.

Dependent on the

United States and Britain for military assistance, India
could not refuse to negotiate with Pakistan; Harriman told
Nehru that public opinion in his country would only favour
generous support to India if it were linked with a
settlement on Kashmir.47

Nehru, welcoming Bowles on his

return to India in 1963, noted that he had been puzzled by
the United States' decision to pressure India to compromise
on Kashmir at a time when Pakistan's support of China made
such a situation politically impossible, the only action by
the United States in 1962 that piqued an otherwise grateful
Indian Government.

LOST OPPORTUNITIES
Following India's debacle in the war with China, and
given prospects of a long phase of Chinese hostility,
India's military requirements had to be given a more
realistic dimension.

Its military unpreparedness, and the

consequent dependence on military assistance from the
United States, made Nehru more willing than at any previous
stage to fit India into the pattern of American policy, an
adjustment that was necessary if India hoped to capitalise
on American assistance.
Expecting the resumption of a Chinese attack somewhere
in the forseeable future, Nehru's government suggested an
agreement whereby India would commit its tactical aircraft
to engage the invading Chinese while the United States
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would undertake the defense of Indian cities.48

Although

Ambassador Galbraith was eager to take the opportunity "by
the ears," as it provided an "economical basis for a
continuing relationship," Washington wanted the
•

Commonwealth to take the lead in any such scheme.

A Q

At

the Nassau meeting in December 1962 between Prime Minister
Macmillian of the United Kingdom and President Kennedy, the
British proved reluctant to undertake the lead, allowing "a
great opportunity to bring India into much closer working
asssociation with the western community, an opportunity
sensed only by the President,

[Philip] Talbot and myself

[Galbraith]," to pass.50
Thus, an opportunity where the Indian Government was
prepared to barter its non-alignment for a military
relationship with the United States came to nought.

Within

a few months, possibly as the result of a decrease in the
level of anti-Chinese hysteria in India, Nehru began to
dismiss suggestions of an American 'air umbrella.'51

He

wanted, instead, United States help in building India's
military forces to be able to defend the nation, and he
requested military assistance worth $500 million over a
period of five years.

Although the State and Defense

Departments were reluctant to upset their Pakistani allies,
Kennedy privately conceded to Bowles, by now appointed
Ambassador to New Delhi, that he supported the request, and
instructed Bowles to explore Indian attitudes and
needs.52
On arriving in India in the summer of 1963, Bowles met
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with Nehru to follow up on the Prime Minister*s request.
Directing Bowles to defense officials, Nehru indicated that
India now required forces strong enough to deter two
aggressive neighbours, Pakistan and China.

By the autumn

of that year, a tentative agreement had been worked out at
the cost of $75 million a year for five years.

Having

negotiated a tentative agreement with the Indians, Bowles
suggested that the United States would welcome India *s
political cooperation in Vietnam and other Southeast Asian
nations, an offer Nehru had rejected in 1961 in Washington,
but which he now promptly accepted.53
Knowing that he had the President's support, and armed
with both a tentative agreement and Nehru's surprising
willingness to help the American position in Southeast
Asia, Bowles arrived in the United States in mid-November.
On reporting to the President, Kennedy informed Bowles that
he would support the proposal regardless of the bureaucrats
at the State and Defense Departments who were anxious not
to annoy Pakistan, and scheduled a meeting of the National
Security Council for 26 November, 1963.54

Four days

before the scheduled meeting was to have taken place,
President Kennedy was assassinated.
President Lyndon B. Johnson, quite naturally, was
anxious to view the agreement from his own perspective, and
asked for the meeting to be postponed.

By May 1964,

another tentative agreement had been reached, and Bowles
was followed to Washington by Indian Defense Minister
Chavan and a team of officials to tie up the loose ends.
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After two weeks of negotiations, an agreement satisfactory
to India, and agreed to by the Secretaries of State and
Defense, had been reached, and a meeting at the White House
set for 28 May.

On 27 May, Prime Minister Nehru passed

away in India.
Although Ambassador Bowles recommended that this was
an important time to demonstrate American support for
India, and the President's Assistant for National Security
Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, agreed, officials at the State and
Defense Departments wanted to watch political developments
in India till "the dust ha[d] a chance to settle."

Knowing

that Indian officials were anxious to sign an agreement
with the United States but were prepared to take advantage
of a Soviet offer to provide similar military hardware,
Bowles urged Washington to act soon, but to no avail.55
In mid-August 1964, the same Indian defense team that had
visited Washington under Chavan, left for Moscow.

They

returned two weeks later with everything they had asked
for, and more.
Even though Galbraith's and Bowles' recommendations
were never adopted by Washington, the period of aborted
negotiations between the two countries serves as an
intereesting back-drop for a commentary on Indo-US
relations during the Kennedy years.
John Kennedy entered the White House with views on the
the Third World and India that fundamentally differed from
those of his immediate two predecessors.

Indo-US relations

had been given form and shape in the Truman and Eisenhower
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administrations under the influence of Cold War rhetoric.
The Kennedy Administration promised to break new ground and
change the direction of these relations, in keeping with
the time.

His tenure, more importantly, witnessed an

important milestone in Indian foreign policy, the Chinese
attack on India, a period when the Indian Government was
prepared to adjust its perceptions of global events to fit
in with American strategic evaluations.

However, when

viewed with the benefit of over twenty years of hindsight,
the promise and intentions of the Kennedy years, with
respect to Indo-US relations, remained just that; they
failed to significantly alter Indo-US relations in a manner
that would serve as a legacy upon which future generations
could build.

The key question is why?

China's attack on India in 1962 and the growing
Sino-Soviet rift opened avenues for a fundamental and
sweeping shift in global politics in Asia.

When Dulles had

sought to build American allies against China and the
Soviet Union on the Asian mainland, India chose to identify
its Asian objectives as being in congruence with those of
China.

Now that China had humiliated India and proved that

it was "one head taller than India imagined herself to be,"
India had to take into account China's threat that it "had
taught India a lesson and, if necessary, would teach her a
lesson again and again."56

Moreover, the Chinese attack

and humiliation of India firmly proved Nehru's premise of
non-alignment allowing the nation to focus primarily on her
economic growth as being misguided, a factor that demanded
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immediate changes in India's foreign policy thinking.
Given the urgency of India's dilemma, Nehru was prepared to
do anything to alleviate the potential disasters of another
Chinese attack, even if it meant compromising on his
fiercly independent view of the world.
Although Nehru's request for military association with
the United States was negated by the Chinese announcement
of a cease-fire, any significant development of the Indian
armed forces required considerable support by the United
States.

India, moreover, had the advantage, it seemed, of

two successive American ambassadors who believed it was
India, not Pakistan, that the US ought to cultivate as its
main Asian ally,57 and an American President who regarded
the future of Asia as being determined by the competition
between India and China.58

With old relations coming

unstuck (Sino-Soviet, Sino-Indian) in a fashion that fitted
in with American interests, the prospects of stronger
American influence in Asia looked promising.

Thus, all the

ingredients for a resulting shift in relations were
satisfied, with only a formal ratification necessary to
begin the institutionalization of these changes.
While the death of two key actors at a time when the
curtain was ready to rise can be attributed to fate, there
is, to my mind, another equally important factor that
prevented an agreement from being signed.
As mentioned earlier, Indo-US relations took both form
and shape in the years of the Cold War, a period that was
dominated by ideological rhetoric and dogma that
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momentarily blinded principal actors from both countries
from allowing a more mature appreciation of the other*s
attitudes, beliefs and concerns.

Having ignored these

factors in the 1950s, bureaucrats in the 1960s had to take
into account the United States* principal ally in South
Asia, Pakistan, an ally that the United States was bound to
by treaty commitments and obligations.

Thus, any dramatic

change in American policy in South Asia had to consider the
likely effects on US-Pakistani relations, a potentially
necessary casualty given the uneasy antagonistic
relationship India and Pakistan shared.
Thus, when I argue that a perceptible change in
Indo-US relations had to be “institutionalized” by a formal
ratification in the form of a treaty that legitimized the
warming of relations, it is the shadow of the Cold War that
I have in mind.

It is the legacy of this rhetoric, this

dogma, that proved to be the spoke in the wheels when an
opportunity for changed surfaced in 1962-63, a legacy to
which bureaucrats of the State and Defense Departments
referred frequently when arguing that a treaty with India
would hurt relations with Pakistan, the United States* main
ally in South Asia.

INDO-PAKISTAN WAR. 1965
1965 was a particularly bad year for Indo-American
relations.

Having lost the initiative for increased

assistance to India to the Soviets in 1964, President
Johnson invited Prime Minister Shastri to visit Washington

77

in the spring of 1965.

Soon after the date had been

finalised by the two governments, Johnson, because of his
hectic schedule, withdrew the invitation, an action that
was taken as an "insult” in New Delhi.

Piqued by the

American decision, Shastri's subsequent comment that the
bombing of North Vietnam was unlikely to bring peace was
played up by the press in both India and the United
States.

Responding to this minor, though irritating,

development, Washington reacted by dragging its feet over
the proposed shipment of American wheat to meet Indian
shortages caused by the failure of the monsoons.59
Just when it appeared that relations between the two
countries could sink no lower in one year, Pakistan
attacked the Indian positions in the Kashmir valley in
August 1965.

Although the United States was not directly

involved in the war or responsible for Pakistan's decision,
Pakistan, as a member of both SEATO and CENTO, was armed
with American equipment, a fear that India had lived with
since 1954.

As Bowles wrote, "Over and over again it was

pointed out to me that every Indian casualty had been
caused by an American bullet, an American shell or an
American hand grenade."60
Eleven years had elapsed since President Eisenhower's
assurance that he would take "appropriate action" if US
arms were ever used against India, and Nehru, in reply, had
doubted the practicality of Eisenhower's assurances.
make matters even worse, when UN observers at the
cease-fire line in Kashmir reported to the Secretary

To
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General that it was Pakistan which had committed the
aggression, high officials at the UN were convinced that
publicizing the report would push Pakistan into a corner
.
.
>
.
i
.
•
•
and make negotiations impossible.
Disappointed with
the UN's failure to publish this report, Indian troops
launched a counter-attack aimed towards Lahore, West
Pakistan's second largest city, to take the pressure off
the Kashmir front, thus spreading the war along the
India-West Pakistan border.
Although India had continually opposed the transfer of
American arms to Pakistan because it breached the "no war"
area of South Asia and brought the Cold War to India's
borders, private Indian fears focussed upon the immediate
threat a militarily supported Pakistan posed to India's
position in the sub-continent.

While the United States had

justified arms transfers as being directed against
communist China— ignoring the development that, by the
mid-1960s, Pakistan had turned to China as its principal
ally— Indian officials hoped Pakistan's use of US equipment
to attack India would remove the wool from American eyes
and make them realise the folly of pursuing their global
policies in the face of regional realities.
The possibility of losing its intelligence base in
Peshawar, Pakistan, still dominated American policy for
South Asia, however.62

The United States had, for almost

a decade, used Peshawar as the launching base for its U-2
intelligence flights over the Soviet Union and China, the
principal reason why officials at the State and Defense
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Departments were hesitant to sanction an arms agreement
with India in 1963-64.

They suspected Pakistan would deny

America access to the Peshawar base in the event of an
Indo-US agreement.

Thus, although the US Ambassador in

Pakistan had privately "protested" against the Pakistani
aggression with American equipment, when Pakistan publicly
denied that any such protest had been made, Washington
remained silent,63 reinforcing the Indian attitude that
New Delhi had been "double-crossed" by the United States.
As is evident, even though the Indo-Pakistan war of
1965 was a regional bilateral issue, its ramifications
transcended the sub-continent and made the United States a
favourite whipping boy for India.

Thus, when the Johnson

Administration, exasperated with the dynamics of regional
politics, suspended all military aid to both Pakistan and
India in 1965, its effects had already been negated, in
Indian eyes, by the fact that Pakistan had attacked with
American weapons, the United Nations, of which the Western
powers had considerable control, refused to declare
Pakistan the "aggressor," and that there was no official
outrage over Pakistan's misuse of American equipment.
Military aid to Pakistan had been suspended, but this
policy applied to India too.

And, in the ultimate

analysis, Nehru's skepticism of Eisenhower's asssurances
had been proven correct, showing up the folly of US
strategic policy in South Asia.
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CHAPTER FOUR

In this examination of the final period, 1969-72, I
will focus upon the attitudes that characterized Mrs.
Gandhi's and Richard Nixon's views of each other, and then
move on to study the effects of the East Pakistan crisis of
1971.

PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS
When the Nixon Administration entered office in
January 1969, American foreign policy for the Indian
sub-continent sought to build relations with both India and
Pakistan.

President Johnson had, in 1967, announced a new

arms policy for the sub-continent.

Exasperated with the

dynamics of Indo-Pakistani antagonism, the Johnson
Administration came to the conclusion that the United
States had few direct interests in South Asia and should
not have to make a choice between India and Pakistan; both
countries were to be treated identically.1

American

grants of military equipment to both countries were
terminated and US military missions were withdrawn.
Further, the Johnson Administration decided that all
subsequent requests for military equipment were to be
treated on a case-by-case basis, with the intention of
84
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improving relations with both India and Pakistan.
By the time President Nixon announced the approval of
a "one-time exception" sale of military equipment to
Pakistan in the summer of 1970, a number of unseen, though
important, forces had begun to change the dynamics of
Indo-US relations, the effects of which were not recognised
till much later.
In India, Indira Gandhi, Nehru*s daughter, succeeded
Lai Bahadur Shastri as Prime Minister in 1966.

Unlike her

father, Mrs. Gandhi was a pragmatist, an individual
uncommitted to the idealistic principles that had
determined the focus of India’s foreign poilcy in the years
after independence.

In the words of Surjit Mansingh, "it

was enough for her to accept facts, adjust to them, and
seek to use them to advantage; she did not project
preconceived theories on the phenomenal world."2

Mrs.

Gandhi's main contribution to India's foreign policy was,
to my mind, her recognition of the use of power as a
crucial determinant in international relations.

Unlike her

predecessors, Mrs. Gandhi was more concerned with the
tangible rather than moral face of foreign relations, a
fact that was revealed in her handling of the Indo-Pakistan
crisis of 1971.
Richard Nixon entered the White House with many
preconceived notions about India.

Unlike his Democratic

predecessors, he was less susceptible to Indian claims of
moral leadership, and regarded his predecessors'
obsequiousness towards India as a prime example of "liberal
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softheadedness.1,3

Nixon and Mrs. Gandhi, moreover,

shared an extremely fractious personal relationship.

Henry

Kissinger, Nixon's Assistant for National Security Affairs,
records that Nixon's comments after meetings with Mrs.
Gandhi "were not always printable," and Christopher Van
Hollen, Nixon's Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Near and South Asian Affairs, notes that, "when Mrs.
Gandhi's actions ran counter to White House desires,
Nixon's customary sobriquet of 'that bitch' was replaced by
more unprintable epithets."4
Pakistan, concurrently, was a country for which Nixon
had special regard.

It was one of the few countries where

Nixon had been received with respect when he was out of
office.
... the bluff, direct military chiefs of Pakistan
were more congenial to him [Nixon] than the
complex and apparently haughty Brahmin leaders of
India.5
When President Yahya Khan visited Washington in October
1970, Nixon assured him that "nobody has occupied the White
House who is friendlier to Pakistan."6
It is important to clarify these attitudes because
they were among the guiding lights that determined American
policies for the sub-continent during the India-Pakistan
crisis of 1971, the subject of this chapter.

THE GENESIS OF THE CRISIS
It was virtually impossible to anticipate the
explosive events of March 1971.

On succeeding Ayub Khan as
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President of Pakistan in 1969, General Yahya Khan publicly
pledged the transfer of power to a civilian government
elected on the basis of direct adult franchise.

Since this

chapter focusses upon the fall-out from the Pakistani
general elections of 1970, I will sketch an outline of the
crisis as it evolved.
In the intense political campaign of 1969-70, the
Awami League under Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Mujib),
campaigning on a six-point platform of regional autonomy
for East Pakistan, won 167 out of the 169 seats it
contested in the East, but made no impact on the West.
Similarly, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), under
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, emerged in a dominant position in the
West, winning 81 of the 138 seats allotted to West
Pakistan.

The PPP did not field any candidates in East

Pakistan.

Thus, according to the election results, the

Awami League won a majority of the 313 seats in the
National Assembly, giving Mujib the right to form a new
government as Prime Minister of Pakistan.
Mujib refused to soften the Awami League's demand of
greater regional autonomy for East Pakistan which would
leave the central government with responsibility only in
the fields of foreign policy and defense.

Bhutto, on the

other hand, was the advocate of a strong central
government, and, viewing the Awami demand as tantamount to
a threat of secession, he threatened to boycott any session
of the National Assembly called before he reached a
political understanding with Mujib.

Yahya, caught in the
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stalemate, did not know what to do.

Although he did not

hold Bhutto in very high esteem, he opposed the
quasi-independence of the East demanded by Mujib.
Expecting the two leaders to iron out their differences,
Yahya postponed the convening of the National Assembly, a
move that antagonised the East.

Hoping that a deadline

would force the two political rivals to compromise, Yahya
re-scheduled the National Assembly for 25 March, 1971.
In a final attempt to resolve the constitutional
crisis, Yahya and Bhutto flew to Dacca to meet with Mujib.
Bhutto, however, feared that a compromise would bring upon
him the wrath of his supporters in West Pakistan.

Mujib,

similarly, could not control the momentum of the Bengali
demand for an autonomous East Pakistan as the answer to
their neglect by the more powerful West.
Unable to break the stalemate, and undoubtedly viewing
Mujib1s version of autonomy as tantamount to independence,
Yahya arrested Mujib on 25 March and established military
rule over East Pakistan to suppress the Awami sponsored
political agitation.

The army, drawn almost exclusively

from the West, unleashed a reign of terror on East
Pakistan, cracking down on the faculty and students of
Dacca University, Bengalis in the police and armed
services, and on all opponents of their regime.

Faced with

the genocidal oppression of the military regime, refugees
began streaming across the border into India, forcing the
crisis in Pakistan to assume an international nature.
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INDIAN AND AMERICAN CONCERNS
With the military suppression of East Pakistan in
March 1971, the United States was caught in a dilemma.
While there was no doubt that the repression in East
Pakistan was reaching genocidal proportions, the United
States had few means by which to influence events in
Pakistan.

Even though there was widespread outrage in the

American bureaucracy, press and Congress over the
atrocities being committed in East Pakistan, the Nixon
Administration was silent about these developments.

As the

carnage continued and the White House failed to issue a
statement of condemnation, Consul General Archer Blood,
from the American mission in Dacca, sent a strong telegram
to Washington, signed by nineteen members of the
Consulate-General, registering "strong dissent” with a
policy that "serves neither our moral interests, broadly
defined, nor our national interests, narrowly defined."8
Similarly, the US Ambassador to New Delhi, Kenneth Keating,
reported to Washington that he was "deeply shocked at the
massacre" and was "greatly concerned at the United States1
vulnerability to damaging association with a reign of
military terror."

He urged the Administration to promptly

and publicly condemn Yahya1s move and to abrogate the 1970
"one-time exception" sale to Pakistan.9
Kissinger, in his spirited defense of White House
policies during 1971 in his memoir, White House Years,
explains the dilemma:
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The United States could not condone a brutal
military repression in which thousands of
civilians were killed and from which millions fled
to India for safety. There was no doubt about the
strong-arm tactics of the Pakistani military.
But
Pakistan was our sole channel to China; once it
was closed it would take months to make
alternative arrangements.10
Van Hollen, in a devastating reply, challenges many
of Kissinger's assumptions and conclusions as being
factually inaccurate.

Further, Van Hollen recognises that

"in addition to the China initiative, Nixon's reaction to
South Asia was influenced by his long-standing dislike for
India and the Indians, and his warm feelings toward
Pakistan.h11
Since there is no dispute over the fact that the White
House's initial reaction to developments in East Pakistan
was the result of the China initiative, it is pertinent to
understand the Sino-US axis that was developing with
Islamabad as the intermediary.
The opening to China was the major US diplomatic
initiative in 1971.

Since America did not officially

recognise the People's Republic of China, Pakistan, because
of its close ties with Beijing, served as the
"go-between."

By April 1971, Islamabad was not only

Kissinger's point of contact but also the likely point of
departure for his secret visit to China.12

Given the

fundamental importance of a diplomatic breakthrough to
China, the White House was of the opinion that it could not
afford to antagonise Yahya Khan of Pakistan, the United
States' channel to China, and the latter's ally.

The State
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Department,

totally ignorant of the secret China

initiative— Secretary of State, William Rogers, only
learned of the initiative in late June13—

moved on its

own to impose a new arms embargo on Pakistan, including
holding the equipment from the "one-time exception" in
abeyance, thereby bringing it into bureaucratic conflict
with the White House, represented by Kissinger.14
Kissinger contends that, in May 1971, the White House
learned of an Indian decision to launch a lightning attack
to take over East Pakistan, the first evidence they had
that Indian plans could upset American geopolitical
objectives.

He writes:

We began increasingly to suspect that Mrs. Gandhi
perceived a larger opportunity. As Pakistan grew
more and more isolated internationally, she
appeared to seek above all Pakistan's humiliation,
perhaps trying to spread the centrifugal
tendencies from East to West Pakistan.15
This, however, is not in keeping with the facts.
Grant Mouser, Political Officer in the United States
Embassy in New Delhi during those tumultuous months of
1971, suggests that Kissinger, in White House Years,
glosses over many of the facts in a retrospective attempt
to justify his actions at a point when they were being
increasingly criticized.

He maintains that although

everyone at the Embassy in New Delhi, like Kissinger in the
White House, recognised the inevitability of East
Pakistan's independence, officials at the Embassy knew of
no such corroborating information indicating an Indian
attack.16

Even Van Hollen, acknowledging that Indians
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were engaged in military contingency planning, asserts that
although Mrs. Gandhi was under strong political pressure to
act more decisively, there was no evidence that she wanted
to go to war in the summer of 1971.17

It is thus

appropriate to turn our attention to India*s interest in
the East Pakistani crisis.
The Indian Government had, until March 1971, viewed
developments in Pakistan as the internal affairs of a
neighbouring country.

Preoccupied with general elections

in India, Mrs. Gandhi adopted a hands-off policy, and, in
mid-March, Indian officials informed the United States that
,

,
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India favoured a united Pakistan. °
However, with a major influx of East Pakistani
refugees into India at the end of March, and with the
establishment of a Bangladesh government-in-exile on Indian
soil, Mrs. Gandhi was forced to take cognizance of events
in Pakistan and formulate a corresponding policy.19
Indistinguishable from the local Indian populace, the
refugees had to be isolated to prevent them from disrupting
Indian economic life and giving vent to existing dissidence
in the Indian states bordering East Pakistan.

Since

tensions between Indian Bengalis and the local populations
of Assam and other northeastern states already existed,
there was constant fear that the addition of East Pakistani
Bengali refugees would aggravate further the delicate
political balance.20

The financial crisis caused by

almost ten million refugees, the danger of a deeper
economic crisis through inflation and the cessation of
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development, the fear of political disruption in states
bordering East Pakistan where dissidence already existed,
and the omnipresent fear of the effects a fusion of the
radical left in West Bengal with the revolutionary youth of
East Pakistan would cause, combined to awaken the Indian
Government to the muti-layered threat the influx of
refugees posed to broadly defined national security.21
India*s principal concern became the return of refugees to
East Pakistan.
While the Indian Government could have recognised the
independence of Bangladesh and the legitimacy of the
government-in-exile, this action would not have alleviated
India*s principal concern, the return of refugees.

The

answer, to India, lay in the formulation of a political
solution in East Pakistan, the only method that would
convince the refugees to return.

Although there were

officials who argued that India should recognise an
independent Bangladesh, others reasoned that Pakistan could
retaliate by 'recognising' Nagaland, an Indian state that
had a secessionist movement.

Moreover, an Indian military

attack, if undertaken, had to guarantee success, and with
the Chinese making threatening noises in the north, this
option was bound to produce more problems rather than
facilitate a solution.22
Although Mrs. Gandhi's Congress party had won a
decisive victory in the 1971 polls, the threat and urgency
the existence of East Pakistani refugees posed to Indian
stability made Mrs. Gandhi's position contingent upon her

94

ability to send them home.
Yahya Khan announced a plan on 28 June to transfer
political power to a civilian government.

This, however,

did not provide a solution to the Indian problem.

Since

the Awami League had been outlawed in East Pakistan, no
civilian government without the Awami League would induce a
return of the refugees.
obvious.

The options open to India were

While an independent Bangladesh under the Awami

League was the only lasting political solution to the
crisis in East Pakistan, India would not officially
recognise an independent Bangladesh until Awami leaders
demonstrated their ability to retain mass support and win
control of East Pakistan, thus facilitiating the return of
the refugees.2 3
Finally, there was the strategic factor as well.
Although India and Pakistan had been antagonistic
neighbours for over 23 years, an independent Bangladesh
would not secure Indiafs eastern border.

While Kissinger

claims that India sought Pakistan's humiliation, an
uncertain future for East Pakistan under anyone other than
Pakistan would not have consolidated India's strategic
position.

While there is no doubt in my mind that India

welcomed an independent Bangladesh under the Awami League
as it secured India's eastern front, the success of the
Awami League, rather than a radical government, was
essential if India was to favour a change to what could
become a hostile East Pakistan.
As the analysis of the problem shows, both India and
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the United States had vested interests in the political
crisis in East Pakistan.

However, while both governments

recognised that an independent Bangladesh was inevitable,
they did not share common interests.24

The White House

was primarily motivated by its desire to preserve Pakistan
as its link with China, and was thus reluctant to force the
pace of developments.

India, on the other hand, sought to

force the pace of developments in East Pakistan to
facilitate the transfer of refugees.

As is clearly

evident, the United States and India had divergent
interests in East Pakistan, as well as divergent methods to
resolve the crisis.

GEOPOLITICAL CALCULATIONS
During the course of Kissinger*s visit to the
sub-continent in July 1971, two important developments took
place.

First, at his secret meeting with the Chinese, Chou

En-lai informed Kissinger that China would not remain
indifferent if India attacked Pakistan.25

Second, after

the announcement on 15 July of Nixon's forthcoming visit to
China, Kissinger made it clear to India that Washington
would not support it in the event of Chinese
intervention.2 6
A treaty between India and the Soviet Union had been
under consideration for over a year.

It was widely

recognised that the main deterrent to an Indian attack of
Pakistan was its fear of Chinese reprisal.

Now, with what

looked like an emerging Washington-Islamabad-Beijing axis,
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a sense of insecurity overswept the Indian Government.27
While the signing of an Indo-Soviet treaty was a
plausible development in the near future, the fact that the
treaty was signed in August was the culmination of the
geostrategic developments that were taking place around
India.

More specifically, it was an insurance policy to

deter China from attacking India.

OQ

As Van Hollen

recognises:
The treaty gave Mrs. Gandhi, who was being
attacked at home for a weak-kneed policy toward
Pakistan, a diplomatic triumph by providing India
with an offset to what many Indians perceived to
be an emerging Washington-Islamabad-Beijing
axis.29
By signing a Treaty of Peace, Friendship and
Cooperation with the Soviets, India strengthened its hand
in promoting its national interests in the evolving
politics of the sub-continent; if China raised the stakes,
it risked Soviet reprisal.

Moreover, it ensured an

uninterrupted supply of military equipment to facilitate an
invasion of East Pakistan, an option that was being
regarded increasingly as the only solution to the crisis.
Although the White House saw the ultimate evolution of
East Pakistan's independence as inevitable, it viewed the
signing of the Indo-Soviet treaty as having objectively
increased the danger of war.30

Kissinger argues:

The Soviet Union had seized a strategic
opportunity.
To demonstrate Chinese impotence and
to humiliate a friend of both China and the United
States proved too tempting.
If China did nothing,
it stood revealed as impotent; if China raised the
ante, it risked Soviet reprisal. With the treaty,
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Moscow threw a lighted match into a powdered
keg.31
However, in this regard Kissinger was wrong.
According to Grant Mouser, Kissinger was imposing a
superpower rivalry on an essentially regional issue, the
forces of which he did not quite comprehend. *

Although

the treaty implied help in the event of Chinese
involvement, the treaty implied neither unequivocal Soviet
support for India nor a cessation of Moscow*s efforts to
encourage a political settlement.

The Soviets favoured a

settlement agreeable to the "entire people of Pakistan,"
and continued to provide economic assistance to them.33
There is no doubt that the Nixon Administration had
succeeded in persuading Yahya to soften his stand on a
number of issues.

However, Kissinger failed to recognise

that the concessions the Pakistanis were willing to make
were no longer relevant to the crisis in East Pakistan.

By

mid-October, the US had secured a timetable for political
change from Yahya, a plan that allowed for the leading
position in government to be held by an East
Pakistani.34

There was, however, no assurance that the

civilian government Yahya planned for December would have
included any Awami Leaguers who reflected the the views of
Mujib, then under secret trial for treason.

Moreover,

since the Awami League had been banned, the most likely
representation from the East would have been a puppet
government, unreflective of the political aspirations of
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the Bengalis.35

Finally, since Mujib and the Bengalis

were, by late 1971, demanding nothing less than complete
independence, a demand neither Yahya nor Bhutto could have
met, there was no solution available that would have
satisfied both sides.
It was within this context that Mrs. Gandhi visited
Washington in early November, a visit described by
Kissinger as "the two most unfortunate meetings Nixon had
with any foreign l e a d e r . N i x o n was unable to convince
Mrs. Gandhi that the civilian government Yahya promised
would represent Bengali self-determination.

Moreover,

he believed that she purposely deceived him about Indian
intentions because her generals were preparing military
plans for West Pakistan while she was still in
Washington. °
By the middle of November, the inevitability of war
was apparent.

Van Hollen reasons that a number of factors

combined to make the military option more attractive to
India: unrelieved pressure of the refugees, a perceived
lack of progress towards political accommodation in East
Pakistan, assurances derived from the Indo-Soviet treaty,
and the probability that the Chinese would not
intervene.

Finally, Mrs. Gandhi had used her visit to

Western capitals in early November to garner support for
India*s contention that the continuing threat to India*s
security, posed by the crisis in East Pakistan, gave New
Delhi the "right to resolve the situation by any means" to
ensure that the refugees returned.40
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Between 22 November and 3 December, Indian troops
crossed the East Pakistani border on a number of occasions,
ostensibly to quell the shelling of Indian territory from
East Pakistan, but undoubtedly also to tighten the screws
on the Pakistan army.41

On 3 December, the war formally

began when Pakistan launched a major attack on eight Indian
airfields in northern and western India, and limited stikes
across the West Pakistan-India border.

Yahya1s desperate

gamble in the west gave India the excuse she needed to
launch a concerted offensive against East Pakistan, while
commiting herself to a "holding action" in the West.42
Kissinger contends that once hostilities started, "we
[Nixon and Kissinger] strove to preserve West Pakistan as
an independent state, since we judged India's real aim was
to encompass its disintegration.1,43

The White House

believed that India's design was to dismember West Pakistan
and convert it into a "vassal state" by rendering it
"impotent."44

He credits this assumption to a "reliable"

source, a report that Nixon and Kissinger were virtually
alone in the United States in interpreting as they did.45
Since the State Department did not share White House
assumptions about India's intentions, American policy for
the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971 was centered in the White
House, a development that led to a decision to order a
naval task force to move towards the Bay of Bengal to scare
off an Indian attack of West Pakistan.46

Convinced that

Indian intransigience had been fuelled by Moscow's highly
"inflammatory role," a role that was seen to accomplish
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the humiliation of both China and the United States,
Kissinger viewed the war in a broad geopolitical context.
Our paramount concern transcended the
sub-continent. The Soviet Union could have
restrained India; it chose not to.
It had, in
fact, actively encouraged war by signing the
Friendship Treaty, giving diplomatic support to
India's maximum demands, airlifting military
supplies, and pledging to veto inconvenient
resolutions in the UN Security Council.
The
Soviets encouraged India to exploit Pakistan's
travail in part to deliver a blow to our system of
alliances, in even greater measure to demonstrate
Chinese impotence.
Since it was a common concern
about Soviet power that had driven Peking and
Washington together, a demonstration of American
irrelevance would severly strain our precious new
relationship with China.47
Worried that a "client" Indian success would
demonstrate the futility of reliance on either China or the
United States as an ally, Kissinger perceived the
Indo-Pakistan war as a "dress rehearsal for the Middle East
in the spring of 1972," an area where US interests were
considerably greater. A ft°
Finally, it was of paramount concern to the White
House to ensure that the Chinese understood that the US was
not m

,
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collusion with the Soviet Union. ^

.

When Kissinger

met with Huang Hua in New York, the latter adopted a hard
line that Kissinger interpreted as an indication that the
Chinese might intervene militarily.

Since Moscow had not

replied positively to American demands to counsel restraint
to the Indians, the White House, expecting Chinese
intervention, now considered whether to assist China if the
Soviet Union retaliated.50

In Kissinger's words:
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Nixon understood immediately that if the Soviet
Union succeeded in humiliating China, all
prospects for world equilibrium would disappear.
He decided— and I fully agreed— that if the Soviet
Union threatened China we would not stand idly
by.... To provide some military means to give
effect to our strategy and to reinforce the
message to Moscow, Nixon now ordered the carrier
task force to proceed through the Strait of
Malacca and into the Bay of Bengal.51
As matters turned out, the Chinese reply from Beijing
was not what the White House expected.

On 14 December,

Soviet representatives reported firm assurances that the
Indian leadership had no plans of seizing West Pakistani
territory.

On 15 December, the Pakistani commander of East

Pakistan surrendered to Indian forces, and, on 16 December,
Mrs. Gandhi ordered an unconditional cease-fire in the
West.
Kissinger contends that the Indian decision to order a
cease-fire was a reluctant one resulting from Soviet
pressure, which in turn grew out of American insistance,
and the movement of the American fleet into the Bay of
Bengal.52
However, a 1978 Brookings Institution study of the US
armed forces as a political instrument concluded its
examination of the Enterprise deployment in 1971 by
emphasizing that "Soviet and Indian support for a
cease-fire was not the result of US military pressure
generated by Task Force 74."53

Moreover, Van Hollen

asserts that, once the military issue in East Pakistan was
resolved, the Soviet Union had been counselling India in
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the direction of a cease-fire in the West all along,
motivated by Soviet interests in South Asia and not
American pressures.

(54 .

Finally, there is no evidence to support Kissinger's
claim that India sought the dismemberment of West
Pakistan.

Having shifted from a position of support for a

united Pakistan, before April, to an independent Bangladesh
under the Awami League, so as to guarantee both the return
of refugees and India's eastern borders, India had already
attained unquestionable regional dominance in the
sub-continent.55

Moreover, the dismemberment of West

Pakistan into four separate states would have created
enormous political instability along India's western flank
and encouraged fissiparous tendencies within India.

The

arguement that India did, indeed, have territorial designs
on West Pakistan, is made even more implausible by the
fact, which Kissinger fails to mention, that at the time
the war ended, Indian forces were in control of
approximately 2,500 square miles of West Pakistan,
territory from which the Indian army voluntarily withdrew.
It is, thus, not surprising that officials from the State
Department and the Embassy in New Delhi did not pay much
heed to Kissinger's "reliable" intelligence source.

RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS
As this analysis of events shows, Nixon and Kissinger
initially reacted to events in East Pakistan with China in
mind, and to the Indo-Pakistan conflict on the basis of
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calculations about a global strategic triangle between the
United States, China and the Soviet Union.

This was

particularly unfortunate as it denied an appreciation of
the more complex and deep rooted issues at stake in the
sub-continent, a veritable world in itself.
By reacting to developments in South Asia from a
geopolitical perspective, the United States clashed with
the regional objectives India sought to achieve.

The

crisis, moreover, surfaced at a time when America was
pursuing its China initiative, a policy being directed from
the White House.

While there is no denying that the

opening to China was an issue of far greater strategic
relevance to the United States than events in the
sub-continent, because the China initiative was being
formulated in the White House, events in South Asia came to
be seen from the White House's geopolitical perspective.
This perspective, however, clouded the White House's
judgement and shielded it from from the regional realities
of the sub-continent, thus obscuring its assessments.

As

Mouser points out, Kissinger viewed the countries of South
Asia in much the same way as the major European powers had
historically reacted to the Balkan states, a quarrelsome
area that upset major power calculations and even caused
wars in the nineteenth century.56

The regional conflict,

for the White House, was an event that diverted attention
from America's opening to China and deliberations over
Nixon's 1972 summit in Moscow.

What the Rudolphs call

"global parochialism" blinded Nixon and Kissinger, and

104

shaped their perceptions of events in South Asia in a way
that was sure to make them clash with Indian
perceptions.
While many of the White House's miscalculations
stemmed from a misapplication of global philosophy to
regional disputes, the fact that the State Department was
being ignored in 1971 compounded the problem.

Thus,

although Nixon and Kissinger may have been correct in
reasoning that China would react adversely to any hard
stand the US adopted towards Pakistan, the White
House-centered system was ill equipped to handle a
multi-faceted regional crisis that had never been on the
regular White House agenda.
The White House, as a result, looked upon India's
interest in the crisis as an excuse to settle old scores by
"dismembering" West Pakistan, and the relatively balanced
nature of the Indo-Soviet relationship as an analogy for a
Soviet "client" acting in concert with Moscow to
"humiliate" American alliances.

This geopolitical

perspective denied an appreciation of regional realities
that permitted solely Indian interests: the existence of
refugees posed a threat to India, a balance it sought to
redress; the dismemberment of Pakistan, however intense the
Indo-Pakistani antagonism may have been, probably would
have threatened Indian security rather than consolidated
it.
Leaving aside the more complex issue of assessments
and true intentions during 1971, there is an almost
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unanimous verdict from both Indian and American scholars
that American foreign policy for South Asia during the
India-Pakistan crisis of 1971 was the result of three
factors: America's China initiative? Nixon's personal
dislike for India, in general, and Mrs. Gandhi, in
particular; and the perception of a continued superpower
rivalry in South Asia.58

Thus, as a result of

perceptions and a combination of these three factors, the
United States terminated all economic assistance for India,
"tilted" towards Pakistan, accused India of being the
"aggressor" in the 1971 war, and, finally, Nixon ordered a
Task Force headed by the USS Enterprise into the Bay of
Bengal to intimidate India. 3
Passions, as a result of these developments, ran high
in India.

On 3 December, reacting to Nixon's threat that

an Indian attack of Pakistan would result in the
termination of American aid to India, Mrs. Gandhi told a
gathering of Congress workers in New Delhi:
Times have changed in the last five years.
If any
country thinks that by calling us aggressor it can
pressurize us to forget our national interests
then that country is living in its own fool's
paradise and it is welcome to that.... Today we
will do what is best in our national interests and
not what these so-called big nations would like us
to do. We value their friendship, help and aid
but we cannot forsake the country's territorial
integrity and sovereignty.60
Similarly, an Indian newspaper, commenting on Indo-US
relations, said:
One of the casualties of the Indo-Pakistani war is
surely whatever little was left of Indo-American
goodwill.
The anti-India bias of President Nixon
in the last eight months has already caused
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serious damage.
The unnecessary display of
strength inherent in the despatch of the Seventh
Fleet to the Bay of Bengal made things even
worse.
Little that the USA may now attempt by way
of amends will ever restore it fully since Indian
public opinion, even if public opinion is
proverbially short, will not soon forget that
President Nixon was apparently prepared to create
a second Bay of Pigs in the sub-continent at a
time when the freedom of 75 million people was at
stake.
As can be seen, Indo-American relations appeared to
have reached their nadir by the end of 1971.

The issue of

greatest relevance to this thesis, as this analysis of
events shows, is that relations in 1971 were determined by
the international strategic environment.

Indian and

American strategic perceptions and interests diverged, and
with the divergence of interests and perceptions over
issues as wide as they were in 1971, relations plummetted.
However, as mentioned in Chapter One, irrespective of
what the US position with regard to India was, the
difference in status between the two countries forced India
to regard the United States as a central figure in her
foreign policy planning.

In 1972, Mrs. Gandhi despatched

her most senior foreign service bureaucrat, T.N. Kaul, to
Washington as Ambassador in an effort to mend fences.
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CONCLUSION

Having reviewed the status of Indo-US relations
between 1947 and 1972, we now turn our attention to an
analysis of the principal factors that determined the
course of these relations.

What this thesis argues is

that, because relations were never planned, they have been
unpredictable.

Because of the extremely limited contact

between the two countries prior to 1947, and the different
historical experiences and geographical locations of the
two countries, Indo-US relations seldom were formed
directly, as the product of a bilateral recognition of
shared interests, but were left aside, ultimately to be
moulded by the international strategic environment.
Moreover, the uncharted and shifting pattern of Indo-US
bilateral relations between 1947 and 1972 is the result of
continuously changing perceptions by both countries during
this period.

Thus, bilateral relations between 1947 and

1972 were marked by a 'zig-zag* pattern.
By the time India emerged from colonial rule as a
sovereign state in 1947, the United States was the world's
leading diplomatic, economic and military power.
Containing the twin threats of the Soviet Union and
international communism had, by 1947, become the
111

112

corner-stone of American foreign policy.
did not share this objective.

India, however,

As the first Asian nation to

win its independence from her colonial rulers, fighting
colonialism and representing Asian interests were the chief
objectives of the new Indian government.

Moreover,

although India was clearly benevolent to the United States'
global position, the perception of being regarded as truly
independent precluded the possibility of a close
association with the United States.
India and the United States, therefore, had separate
interests and objectives, the result of different
historical experiences, geographic locations, and the
difference in status between the two countries.

India, as

a result, chose a policy of non-alignment from the military
blocs to represent its interests, a deliberate choice to
distance itself from the evolving nature of global
politics.

Having made this decision, a weak, newly

independent India had little to offer the United States, a
global power fully engaged in the Cold War.
The fall of China to communism in 1949 represented a
watershed in American strategic thinking.

The United

States adopted NSC-68 as its strategic doctrine, and
initially looked upon India as a potential Asian ally.
India, however, was concurrently improving relations with
its northern neighbour, and declared its Asian interests
and objectives to be in congruence with those of communist
China, interests of the latter that the US sought to deter.
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The fall of China to communism, the explosion of a
Soviet atomic bomb, and the evolving crisis in Korea
dictated American foreign policy.

Having decided upon a

strategy of perimeter defense, the United States sought to
recruit allies on the Asian mainland.

India, however, by

commiting itself to a policy of non-alignment and
friendship with China, disqualified itself from
consideration, a development that led to its rival
neighbour, Pakistan, entering a military pact with the
United States in 1954.
Dulles regarded a policy of non-alignment as
"immoral," a view that led to the isolation of India by the
United States between 1954 and 1960.

The summary of events

supports the view that this isolation of India was the
result of divergent strategic perceptions leading to
divergent interests and objectives between the two
countries, a situation that, in the 1950s, necessitated
American indifference towards Indian interests.
John Kennedy entered the White House in 1961 with
views on non-alignment and the Third World that differed
fundamentally from those of the preceeding administration.
Convinced that the economic competition between India and
China would determine the future of Asia, he committed
himself to improving Indo-American bilateral relations.
With China's attack of India in 1962, Nehru's Government
came to share the American interest in opposing India's
northern communist neighbour, a convergence of interests
that facilitated United States' support of India in 1962.
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The Harriman Mission, the most visible expression of
American support of India in 1962, indicated to Nehru that
long term US support had to be preceeded by India resolving
its long-standing dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir.
Although this opposed declared Indian interests, India
recognised that it was a necessary development in order to
secure American assistance, thus leading to a shift in the
Indian position on Kashmir.
After the 1962 conflict, Indian military preparedness
had to be given a more realistic dimension, a development
that required substantial American assistance.

The Kennedy

Administration was prepared to meet Indian requirements,
and Nehru agreed to support the United States' position in
Southeast Asia, a commitment he had refused to make in
1961.

This shift in Indian perceptions was the result of

the recognition that any potential treaty with the United
States, as was being negotiated at the time, meant a more
benevolent Indian view of American interests, a compromise
Nehru was willing to make.
Even though deliberations between the United States
and India in 1963-64 did not result in the signing of a
treaty, the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965 fits in well with my
argument.

When President Johnson, exasperated with Indian

and Pakistani intransigience, imposed an arms embargo on
the sub-continent in 1965, inherent in the decision was a
belated American recognition that divergent American and
sub-continental historical experiences and locations led to
divergent strategic interests. Although the United States
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provided military assistance to Pakistan to bolster the
latter's defenses to contain a perceived northern communist
threat, the 1965 war served as a realisation that while
communism was the ostensible reason for the US-Pakistan
treaty of 1954, Pakistan looked upon India, not communism,
as its primary threat.
The third and final study, the 1971 East Pakistan
crisis and the subsequent Indo-Pakistan war, is perhaps the
best example of the divergence in interests and objectives
between the United States and India.
The United States had a geopolitical interest in the
crisis, while India's involvement stemmed from a more
immediate regional perspective.

Although the two countries

were not pitted against each other, they defined their
interests and objectives in a manner that encroached upon
the other's interest.

Thus, 1971 witnessed a period when

the clash of interests and objectives, born out of
divergent strategic perspectives, led to a period of
extremely strained Indo-American bilateral relations.

Even

more interesting, from the perspective of this thesis, is
the fact that this clash of interests was the result of
perspectives made from divergent planes: a geopolitical
perspective, one that takes the global equilibrium into
consideration, versus a regional view.

The difference in

perspectives, moreover, was a manifestation of the
divergence in strategic importance between the two
countries: the United States was a superpower; India had
regional aims and ambitions.
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On 11 August, 1971, Kissinger notes, "Nixon admitted
to the Senior Review Group that in Mrs. Gandhi's position
he might pursue a similar course."1

But he was not.

Whilst Nixon may have understood Mrs. Gandhi's concerns and
reasons for behaving as she did, India's actions,
nevertheless, jeopardised American interests.

Thus, the

effect of the events of 1971 was a period of extremely
strained bilateral relations.
In the final analysis, the contention that
Indo-American relations were moulded by the international
strategic environment holds true.

Moreover, the period

between 1947 and 1972 demonstrates that close bilateral
relations hinged upon the convergence of strategic
perceptions and interests.

Thus, the characterization of

Indo-US relations as a series of alternating currents is
perhaps an apt one.

The alternations, moreover, can be

described as follows: security pacts vs. non-alignment
(1947-54); friendship and convergence of interests
(1961-64) vs. alienation (1954-60); global aspirations vs.
regional realities (1971).
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NOTES for CONCLUSION

^■Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1979), p. 879.
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